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AbstrAct 
In the midst of  an energy crisis, sub-Saharan Africa is a global outlier 
with respect to power infrastructure and is literally without power. Nearly 
600 million Africans—roughly two-thirds of  the region—currently lack ac-
cess to consistent, reliable, and affordable electricity, constituting a signifi-
cant barrier to economic and social development, the deprivation of  a num-
ber of  socio-economic rights, and a cause of  environmental degradation. 
The Power Africa Initiative, announced in June 2013, seeks to double access 
to power in sub-Saharan Africa over the next five years through an innovati-
ve public-private partnership between United States governmental agencies, 
private sector energy and infrastructure firms, and six African governments. 
This paper fills a gap in both the legal and policy literatures by identifying 
the implementation challenges to Power Africa and the broader theoreti-
cal question of  the institutional and regulatory obstacles to power sector 
reform and development in sub-Saharan Africa. Drawing on the political 
economy and international development literatures, this paper contends that 
low state capacity and the presence of  urban bias in African states represent 
significant implementation challenges to Power Africa. Specifically, weak 
and incapacitated state apparatuses and a lack of  state autonomy vis-à-vis 
urban elites have created centralized hybrid power markets and regulatory 
frameworks that are systematically biased against the extension of  electricity 
into rural areas and have marginalized independent power producers (IPPs) 
and potential rural consumers. Ultimately, without additional institutional 
and regulatory reforms, the core goal of  Power Africa—rural electrifica-
tion—will be significantly limited by a lack of  commercial sustainability for 
independent power projects and a lack of  consumer affordability to access 
power. 
Keywords: access to electricity, public-private partnership, Power Africa ini-
tiative, public policy, public reform
 “… And I have to say, those who are involved in this process, they 
continually tell us the problem is not going to be private-sector 
financing. The problem is going to be getting the rules right, creating 
the framework whereby we can build to scale rapidly.”
United States President Barack Obama, speaking on electricity access 
in Africa, 
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 2013
“There you have it—reforms on unprepared ground, and copied 
from foreign institutions as well—nothing but harm!”
Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov
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1. IntroductIon
Shango exists in Yoruba ritual thought as the deity of  thunder and lightning. Although the patron deity 
of  the Old Oyo Empire was established in the fourteenth century, the potency of  the belief  in the powers 
of  Shango has continued to present day. A sculpture created in his image stands publicly at the Marina in 
Lagos, Nigeria, as the symbol of  the Power Holding Company of  Nigeria, Nigeria’s public power utility 
agency.1 Shango would undoubtedly be displeased with the current state of  sub-Saharan Africa, as the 
region is a “global outlier with respect to power infrastructure and is literally without power.”2 The power 
crisis in sub-Saharan Africa is best conceptualized as a “paradox of  plenty.”3 Despite being endowed with 
abundant renewable energy resources,4 nearly 600 million people in sub-Saharan Africa—roughly two-thirds 
of  the region—lack access to electricity.5 The per capita installed power generation capacity in sub-Saharan 
Africa is approximately one-third of  South Asia’s and about one-tenth of  Latin America’s.6 Even compared 
with other country groups in the same income bracket, sub-Saharan Africa’s power generation capacity 
growth is barely half  of  that of  other developing regions.7 Sub-Saharan Africa is the only world region in 
which per capita consumption of  electricity is actually decreasing over time.8 Within the region, significant 
disparities exist between urban and rural access to electricity, with rural electrification rates routinely below 
5%.9 Despite significant power sector reforms beginning in the 1980s and the provision of  extensive sub-
sidies, electrification rates have not improved, and electrical utilities have operated in a state of  persistent 
dysfunction.10 Indeed, access to electricity is a “particularly African problem.”11
In light of  the ongoing lack of  access to electricity in the region and its significant micro- and macro-eco-
nomic developmental effects, critics have called for additional reforms to pay explicit attention to institutio-
nal and financing mechanisms for increasing access to electricity.12 According to the International Energy 
Agency, sub-Saharan Africa will require more than $300 billion in investment to achieve universal electricity 
1  See IRELE, Abiola; JEYIFO, Biodun (Ed). The oxford encyclopedia of african ThoughT 334 . Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010.
2  Anton Eberhard & Maria Shkaratan, Powering Africa: Meeting the Financing and Reform Challenge, 42 energy pol’y 9, 10 
(2012).
3  See generally Terry lynn Karl, The paradox of plenTy: oil Booms and peTro-sTaTes (1997) (describing the paradox that 
countries with natural resource abundances tend to have lower levels of  economic growth and worse development outcomes than 
countries with fewer natural resources).
4  See, e.g., Y. Azoumah et al., Sustainable Electricity Generation for Rural and Peri-Urban Populations of  sub-Saharan Africa: 
the “Flexy-Energy” Concept, 39 energy pol’y 131, 132 (2011); Abeeku Brew-Hammond & Francis Kemausuor, Energy for All in 
Africa—to be or not to be?!, 1 currenT opinions envTl. susTainaBiliTy 83, 86 (2009), Y.S. Mohammed et al., Status of  Renewable 
Energy Consumption and Developmental Challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa, 27 renewaBle & susTainaBly energy rev. 453, 456-
60 (2013); anTon eBerhard eT al., africa’s power infrasTrucTure: invesTmenT, inTegraTion, efficiency 1-2, 54 (2011); Uwe 
Deichman et al., The Economics of  Renewable Energy Expansion in Rural Sub-Saharan Africa, 39 energy pol’y 215, 227 (2011).
5  inT’l energy agency (iea). World Energy Outlook. Available in:
<http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/resources/energydevelopment/energyaccessdatabase/>. (last visited July 25, 2014) (here-
inafter “WEO”).
6  eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 2-3.
7  id. at 3; see generally Tito Yepes et al., Making Sense of  Africa’s Infrastructure Endowment: A Benchmarking Approach (The 
World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4912, 2008).
8  eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 6. Notably, sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia were equal in their installed capacities during 
the 1980s. 
9  Theo Chidiezie Chineke & Fabian M. Ezike, Political Will and Collaboration for Electric Power Reform through Renewable 
Energy in Africa, 38 energy pol’y 678, 683 (2010).
10  See Anton Eberhard et al., Underpowered: The State of  the Power Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa 14-15 (The World Bank, Background 
Paper No. 6, 2008); eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 79-80, 88-89, 91; Morgan Bazilian et al., Energy Access Scenarios to 2030 for the 
Power Sector in sub-Saharan Africa, 20 uTil. pol’y 1, 2 (2012).
11  Mimi Alemayehou, Exec. Vice President, Overseas Private Inv. Corp., Testimony before the United States Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations at the Hearing on the Power Africa Initiative (Mar. 26, 2014) (hereinafter “OPIC Testimony”).
12  See Brew-Hammond & Kemausuor, supra note 4, at 84; Patricia Nelson, An African Dimension to the Clean Development Mechanism: 
Finding a Path to Sustainable Development in the Energy Sector, 32 denv. J. inT’l l. & pol’y 615, 626 (2004).
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access by 2030.13 The Power Africa Initiative (Power Africa or the Initiative), announced in South Africa in 
June 2013 by President Obama, seeks to double access to power in sub-Saharan Africa by adding more than 
10,000 megawatts (MW) of  clean, efficient electricity generation capacity over the next five years.14 Power 
Africa aims to extend electrical access to 20 million Africans through an innovative and large-scale public-
-private partnership that focuses on private sector independent power facilities involving a dozen United 
States governmental agencies, private sector energy and infrastructure firms, and six African governments.
Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on Africa, Paul Hinks, CEO 
of  Symbion Power and Chairman of  the Corporate Council on Africa, noted that “[t]he focus in 2014 
should be on addressing some of  the significant challenges facing the Power Africa Initiative, in order to 
pave the way for more private-sector investment in the future.”15 Less than a year into Power Africa, African 
bureaucracies have already been identified as a major obstacle to private sector power investment under 
Power Africa.16 The legal literature has devoted little attention to Power Africa as well as more generally to 
the issue of  electrification and energy generation in sub-Saharan Africa. Although the policy literature has 
identified a number of  institutional and regulatory problems associated with power sectors in sub-Saharan 
Africa, little attention has been paid to why these obstacles persist.
This paper addresses both the existing gap within the literature on the implementation challenges to 
Power Africa and the broader theoretical question of  the institutional and regulatory obstacles to power 
sector reform and development in sub-Saharan Africa. Drawing on the political economy and international 
development literatures, I contend that low state capacity and the presence of  urban bias in African states 
represent significant implementation challenges to Power Africa. Specifically, weak and incapacitated state 
apparatuses and a lack of  autonomy vis-à-vis urban elites have created centralized hybrid power markets 
and regulatory frameworks that are systematically biased against the extension of  electricity into rural areas 
and have marginalized independent power producers (IPPs) and potential rural consumers.  Accordingly, 
this paper makes two important contributions to the literature by filling an empirical gap through an analysis 
of  the implementation challenges of  Power Africa and electrification reform in sub-Saharan Africa, and 
by introducing a multi-disciplinary theoretical framework to explain the creation of  a legal and regulatory 
framework that is a considerable obstacle to the implementation of  Power Africa and power sector reform 
more broadly.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a background to the power crisis in sub-Saharan 
Africa and the motivation for Power Africa by reviewing the literature on energy and electrical infrastructure 
as inputs for economic, environmental, and social development and as a human right. Section III outlines 
Power Africa and identifies its key actors, goals, and policy mechanisms. Section IV develops a theoretical 
framework of  state capacity and urban bias as causal mechanisms for the creation of  hybrid power markets 
and regulatory frameworks that marginalize IPPs and deter the extension of  electrical access to rural areas. 
Three empirical sections follow. Section V links issues of  state capacity and urban bias to the institutional 
structures of  the power sectors and electrical markets in sub-Saharan Africa. Section VI introduces princi-
13  See The whiTe house, Fact Sheet: Power Africa (June 30, 2013), Available in: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-of-
fice/2013/06/30/fact-sheet-power-africa>; eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 149.
14  u.s. agency for inT’l dev. (USAID), Power Africa. Available in: <http://www.usaid.gov/powerafrica> (last visited July 25, 
2014).
15  Paul Hinks, Chief  Exec. Officer of  Symbion Power, Testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions at the Hearing on the Power Africa Initiative (Mar. 26, 2014) (hereinafter “Hinks Testimony”).
16  See e.g., Immaculate Karambu, Bureaucracy Frustrating the Work of  Power Agency, daily naTion (Mar. 22, 2014). Available in: 
<http://www.nation.co.ke/business/Bureaucracy-frustrating-the-work-of-power-agency-/-/996/2254042/-/51jfee/-/index.
html> (noting that Earl Gast, USAID’s Assistant Administrator for Africa, declared that the pace of  private sector investment has 
been hurt by an unfriendly regulatory environment); Power Africa: Market Reactions to the Obama Initiative, proJecT finance newswire 
(Chadbourne & Parke LLP), Dec. 2013, at 32 (noting that Paul Hinks believes that the big challenge of  Power Africa is navigating 
the bureaucracies of  many African countries); Hinks Testimony, supra note 15 (noting the creditworthiness of  the power off-taker 
as a serious concern).
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ples and models of  federalism to understand how the centralization of  electricity infrastructure deters fur-
ther rural electrification.  Section VII extends this theoretical framework to the regulatory sphere, conten-
ding that the existence of  urban bias foments a regulatory framework for power that limits the commercial 
sustainability of  private sector power projects and limits rural electrification. Section VIII concludes and 
offers policy recommendations and implications for future research.
2. EmpowErIng dEvElopmEnt: thE ImpEtus for powEr AfrIcA
This section identifies the impetus for and importance of  the Power Africa Initiative. First, context and 
background to sub-Saharan Africa’s energy crisis is provided, describing both regional trends in a lack of  
access to electricity and low installation capacity as well as staggering intra-regional differences in access be-
tween urban and rural areas. Second, a review of  the literature clearly indicates the importance of  consistent 
access to electricity with respect to economic, environmental, and social development, particularly through the 
mechanisms of  macroeconomic growth, firm productivity, improvements to human capital stocks and labor 
productivities, and lower levels of  deforestation and greenhouse gas emissions. Additionally, the human rights 
literature emphasizes the importance of  access to electricity as being integral to the realization of  a number of  
existing socio-economic rights, specifically rights to gender equality and the right to adequate housing. 
Shango in chains: the current state of african power
Crisis and paradox best characterize the state of  power infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa. Nearly half  
of  the 1.2 billion people globally without access to electricity reside in sub-Saharan Africa.17 Only 32% of  
sub-Saharan Africans have access to electricity, and 79% still rely on traditional use of  biomass for cooking, 
establishing it as the most power-impoverished region in the world.18 By comparison, access to electricity 
is 65% in South Asia,19 90% in East Asia,20 and 95% in Latin America.21 Additionally, sub-Saharan Africa 
has the lowest power generation capacity of  any world region, and capacity growth has stagnated relative to 
other developing regions.22 The combined power generation capacity of  sub-Saharan Africa is sixty-eight 
gigawatts (GW), the equivalent of  Spain.23 If  South Africa is excluded, the total falls to twenty-eight GW, 
the equivalent of  Argentina.24 Even this data may be an overstatement because as much as 25% of  installed 
capacity is operational due to aging power plants and a lack of  maintenance.25
To paint an even dimmer picture, the lack of  access to electricity is significantly disparate between urban 
and rural areas.26 Approximately 60% of  urban populations have access to electricity compared to less than 
17  WEO, supra note 5.
18  Id. For citations of  similar statistics, see Bazilian et al., supra note 10, at 4; Brew-Hammond & Kemasuor, supra note 4, at 
83; Raffaella Centurelli, Energy poverTy: can we maKe modern energy access universal? focus on financing appropriaTe 
susTainaBle energy Technologies, 22 colo. J. inT’l envTl. l. & pol’y 219, 221 (2011); Youba Sokona et al., Widening Energy 
Access in Africa: Towards Energy Transition, 47 energy pol’y 3, 7 (2012); eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 5.
19  eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 5.
20  id.
21  WEO, supra note 5.
22  See eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 1; Sokona et al., supra note 18, at 7.
23  eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at at 2. 
24  Id. 
25  Id.
26  See Abeeku Brew-Hammond, Energy Access in Africa: Challenges Ahead, 38 energy pol’y 2291, 2293 (2010); Charles Mooga 
Haanyika, Rural Electrification Policy and Institutional Linkages, 34 energy pol’y 2977, 2977 (2006); Stephen Karekezi & John Kimani, 
Status of  Power Sector Reform in Africa: Impact on the Poor, 30 energy pol’y 923, 924 (2002). 
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15% of  rural populations in sub-Saharan Africa.27 Rural electrification levels routinely fall below 5%.28 Com-
pared to the rest of  the world, there are both lower levels of  access in absolute terms as well as higher levels 
of  urban-rural disparity.29 Consistent with this urban-rural disparity, access to electricity varies significantly 
based on income.30 Only 4% of  the lowest income quintile has access to electricity compared to 74% of  the 
highest income quintile in sub-Saharan Africa.31
In addition to a dearth of  access, sub-Saharan Africa’s power infrastructure is (in)famously unreliable, 
as national electricity grids are “generally bedeviled with intermittent power supply and sometimes power 
rationing.”32 Manufacturing enterprises experience power outages of  fifty-six days per year on average.33 For 
instance, according to World Bank enterprise survey data, firms in Senegal, Tanzania, and Burundi expe-
rienced power outages for an average of  45, 63, and 144 days, respectively.34 By comparison, a typical power 
security standard in the United States is one day in ten years.35
Unfortunately, the power crisis in sub-Saharan Africa is a worsening problem. Drought has seriously re-
duced the power available to countries with significant hydropower installments and that are dependent on 
water as an input to power production.36 High and volatile international oil prices have put pressure on oil-
-importing countries, especially those dependent on diesel and heavy fuel oil for power generation.37 Military 
conflict has severely damaged or destroyed much of  the infrastructure in a number of  countries, including 
the Central African Republic, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia.38 With a business as usual approach, 40% 
of  African countries will not reach the goal of  universal access to electricity by 2050.39 Sub-Saharan Africa 
is the only region in which per capita consumption of  electricity is dropping over time.40 Projecting present 
electrification rates and population growths, more people in sub-Saharan Africa will be without electricity 
in 2030 than today.41 
The paradoxical part of  sub-Saharan Africa’s power crisis is the significant natural resource endowments 
that can fuel electric power generation.42 Specifically, the literature has focused on the renewable energy 
potential that is many times the current energy consumption of  African states.43 Sub-Saharan Africa has sig-
27  Raluca Golumbeanu & Douglas Barnes, Connection Charges and Electricity Access in Sub-Saharan Africa 3-4 (The World Bank, 
Policy Research Working Paper No. 6511, 2013).
28  Chineke & Ezike, supra note 9, at 683.
29  See Golumbeanu & Barnes, supra note 27, at 3-4.
30  A. Estache, What do we know about Sub-Saharan Africa’s Infrastructure and the Impact on its 1990s Reforms? 33, 40 (The World Bank, 
Draft Working Paper, 2005).
31  Gisela Prasad, Improving Access to Energy in sub-Saharan Africa, 3 currenT opinions envTl. susTainaBiliTy 248, 249 (2011).
32  Brew-Hammond & Kemausuor, supra note 4, at 83. See also Eberhard et al., supra note 10, at v, 10-11; eBerhard eT al., supra 
note 4, at 7-8.
33  Eberhard et al., supra note 10, at v, 4.
34  eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 7.
35  Eberhard et al., supra note 10, at v-vi.
36  See eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 12; Eberhard et al., supra note 10, at 13.
37  See id.
38  See eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 12; Eberhard et al., supra note 10, at 13.
39  Golumbeanu & Barnes, supra note 4, at 4.
40  See eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 6; Eberhard & Shkaratan, supra note 2, at 9.
41  Prasad, supra note 31, at 248.
42  See Katharine Gratwick & Anton Eberhard, An Analysis of  Independent Power Projects in Africa: Understanding Development and 
Investment Outcomes 16 (Mgmt. Program in Infrastructure Reform & Reg., Working Paper, 2007); eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 2.
43  See Deichman et al., supra note 4, at 2. 
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nificant hydro,44 biomass,45 solar,46 geothermal,47 and wind resources.48 For instance, Namibia has an annual 
potential production of  100 times its current energy consumption, a statistic more driven by high potential 
production than low consumption.49 Median countries, such as Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Benin, have a 
production capacity of  ten-to-twelve times current consumption.50 These resources are particularly valua-
ble due to the increasing premium commanded by zero- or low-carbon renewable energies based on their 
abilities to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions and the cost volatility and geopolitical issues associated 
with fossil fuels.51 
Economic, environmental, and social development
Energy poverty, defined as the “absence of  sufficient choice in accessing adequate, affordable, reliable, high 
quality, safe, and environmentally benign energy services to support economic and human development”,52 
has serious implications for development on both positive economic and normative grounds. Not only 
does a lack of  access to electricity have significant effects on the economic and social development of  in-
dividuals, households, and businesses, it also undermines the enjoyment of  a wide range of  human rights, 
particularly those relating to the improvement of  living standards.53 It also has significant environmental 
implications pertaining to forest management and greenhouse gas emissions, critical components of  climate 
change. Over the past twenty years, there has been an abundant and growing literature that has focused on 
the positive effects of  energy and energy infrastructure on economic growth and development.54 Although 
energy has no intrinsic value, access to the products and lifestyle changes that the availability of  adequate 
modern energy services provides has established energy as one of  the “essential inputs for socioeconomic 
development.”55 The most evident link between energy infrastructure and income is the productivity effect 
in a production function framework where an increase in the quantity of  infrastructure raises the marginal 
productivity of  other factors.56
The literature identifies electrical energy and electric power infrastructure as particularly significant to 
economic growth and development. Underinvestment in electricity and weak energy infrastructures have 
caused poor economic performance and constrain future development in sub-Saharan Africa.57 Calderón 
44  See Azoumah, supra note 4, at 132; Brew-Hammond & Kemausuor, supra note 4, at 86; Mohammed et al., supra note 4, at 459-
60; eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 2.
45  See Brew-Hammond & Kemausuor, supra note 4, at 86; Mohammed et al., supra note 4, at 456-58; Azoumah et al., supra note 
4, at 132.
46  See Azoumah, supra note 4, at 132; Brew-Hammond & Kemausuor, supra note 4, at 86; Chineke & Ezike, supra note 9, at 679; 
Mohammed et al., supra note 4, at 458-59; eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 2.
47  See Brew-Hammond & Kemausuor, supra note 4, at 86; Mohammed et al., supra note 4, at 460; eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, 
at 2.
48  See Azoumah et al., supra note 4, at 132; Brew-Hammond & Kemausuor, supra note 4, at 86; eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 2.
49  Deichman et al., supra note 4, at 2. 
50  Id.
51  See id.; Sokona et al., supra note 18, at 6.
52  Amulya K.N. Reddy, Energy and Social Issues, in uniTed naTions developmenT program, world energy assessmenT: energy 
& The challenge of susTainaBiliTy 44 (2000). Available at: <www.undp.org/energy/activities/wea/drafts-frame.html>.
53  See Jenny Sin-hang Ngai, Energy as a Human Right in Armed Conflict: A Question of  Universal Need, Survival, and Human Dignity, 37 
BrooK. J. inT’l l. 579, 581 (2012).
54  See, e.g., Sokona et al., supra note 18, at 3 (collecting literature); Smail Khennas, Understanding the Political Economy and Key Drivers 
of  Energy Access in Addressing National Energy Access Priorities and Policies: African Perspective, 47 energy pol’y 21, 21 (2012); Mohammed 
et al., supra note 4, at 453, 455; Vivien Foster & Jevgenijs Steinbucks, Paying the Price for Unreliable Power Supplies: In-House Generation of  
Electricity by Firms in Africa 2 (The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4913, 2009).
55  Brew-Hammond, supra note 26, at 2291; see also Adrian J. Bradbrook et al., A Human Dimension to the Energy Debate: Access to 
Modern Energy Services, 26 J. energy & naT. resources l. 526, 529 (2008) (emphasizing energy services).
56  See Paul Cook, Infrastructure, Rural Electrification, and Development, 15 energy for susTainaBle dev. 304, 305 (2011); Stephen R. 
Tully, The Contribution of  Human Rights to Universal Energy Access, 4 nw. u. J. inT’l hum. rTs. 518, 519 (2006). But see Cook, supra note 
56, at 306; Deichman et al., supra note 4, at 5 (noting an endogeneity issue). 
57  See, e.g., H. Esfahani & M. Ramirez, Institutions, Infrastructure, and Economic Growth, 70 J. dev. econ. 443, 443 (2010).
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finds that if  African countries were to catch up with the regional leader, Mauritius, in terms of  infrastructure 
stock and quality, their per capita economic growth rates would increase by an average of  2.2% per year.58 
Catching up with the East Asian median country, the Republic of  Korea, would bring gains of  2.6% per 
year.59 Indeed, in sub-Saharan Africa, “the most expensive electricity is no electricity at all.”60
In addition to productivity increases, access to electricity helps address a plethora of  social development 
goals and helps to build and develop human capital.61 Myriad improvements to health outcomes are attri-
butable to access to electricity.62 Access to modern forms of  energy is essential for the provision of  clean 
water and sanitation.63 A reduction in the use of  biomass for heating and cooking reduces the incidences 
of  eye problems, burns, respiratory illnesses, and cancer associated with combustion of  these materials.64 
Electricity addresses the incidences of  HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases by improving the healthcare 
infrastructure by enabling health clinics and hospitals to refrigerate vaccines, boil water, sterilize equipment, 
incinerate used syringes, provide light, and transport patients.65 Greater access to electricity has been also 
linked to better educational outcomes such as literacy rates and primary school completion rates.66 Higher 
quality lighting allows for more time for reading and studying in the absence of  sunlight.67 Additionally, the 
task of  collecting fuel for traditional biomass energy sources or hauling water are time consuming processes 
that come with a high opportunity cost; access to electricity allows children to greatly reduce or eliminate 
such chores and spend more time attending school.68 
Reliance on traditional biomass also has significant and deleterious effects on the environment, parti-
cularly when wood and charcoal are used as fuels. Fuel wood collection is a core cause of  tropical defores-
tation.69 A number of  negative environmental externalities are associated with deforestation, including soil 
salinization, desertification, and a loss of  biological diversity.70 Forests play a critical role in climate change 
by absorbing carbon dioxide; thus, poor forest management in order to support the charcoal industry runs 
counter to the reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) mechanism of  the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.71 Additionally, because of  inefficient technolo-
gy, the incomplete combustion of  traditional biomass releases methane, a more potent greenhouse gas than 
carbon dioxide.72 The use of  traditional and unsustainable biomass cooking energy fuels has significantly 
higher greenhouse gas emissions compared to liquefied petroleum gas and biogas.73
58  Cesar Calderón, Infrastructure and Growth in Africa iv (The World Bank, Working Paper No. 3, 2008).
59  Id.
60  Bernard TenenBaum eT al., from The BoTTom up: how small power producers and mini-grids can deliver elecTrifi-
caTion and renewaBle energy in africa 239 (2014).
61  See Stephen Tully, Access to Electricity as a Human Right, 24 neTh. Q. hum. rTs. 557, 560, 567 (2006); Bas J. van Ruijven et al., 
Model-based Scenarios for Rural Electrification in Developing Countries, 38 energy 386, 386-87; Haanyika, supra note 26, at 2977.
62  See Golumbeanu & Barnes, supra note 27, at 4.
63  See Centurelli, supra note 18, at 222; Tully, supra note 56, at 520.
64  See Jennifer N. Brass et al., Power for Development: A Review of  Distributed Generation Projects in the Developing World,  37 ann. rev. 
env’T  & resources 107, 117 (2012); Centurelli, supra note 18, at 225-26. 
65  Tully, supra note 56, at 52.
66  See eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 16, 119 (collecting literature).
67  See Brass et al., supra note 64, at 116, 118; Adrian Bradbrook & Judith G. Gardam, Placing Access to Energy Services within a Human 
Rights Framework, 28 hum. rTs. Q. 389, 395 (2006).
68  Golumbeanu & Barnes, supra note 27, at 4; Bradbrook & Gardam, supra note 67, at 395; Tully, supra note 56, at 520; Centurelli, 
supra note 18, at 227. See also infra notes 100-1.
69  Nogoye Thiam, Towards a Sustainable Energy System for Africa: An African Perspective on Energy Security, in facing gloBal environ-
menTal change 448 (Hans Günter Brauch et al., eds. 2009).
70  See id.; Nicasius Achu Check, Climate Change and Water Degradation, in africa in a changing gloBal environmenT: perspec-
Tives on climaTe change adapTaTion and miTigaTion sTraTegies in africa 14 (Shingirirai Savious Mutanga et al., eds. 2013).
71  See Shakespear Mudombi, Exploring the Challenges and Opportunities for Low Carbon Climate Resilient Development in Africa, in africa 
in a changing gloBal environmenT: perspecTives on climaTe change adapTaTion and miTigaTion sTraTegies in africa 154 
(Shingirirai Savious Mutanga et al., eds. 2013). 
72  gloBal energy assessmenT, gloBal energy assessmenT: Toward a susTainaBle fuTure 183 (2012).
73  Id. 
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Energy poverty has a disproportionate effect on women, as they are often responsible for collecting 
firewood, hauling water, and cooking.74 As the first female President of  an African state, Liberian President 
Ellen-Johnson Sirleaf, noted,
I’m particularly concerned about the disproportionate impact energy poverty has on women and girls. In 
many places without power, women and girls are forced to spend hours each day in the time-consuming 
task of  hunting for fuel and firewood—often a key reason that girls spend less time in school than boys. 
Women are also disproportionately affected by respiratory illness as a result of  indoor air pollution from 
open fires and kerosene used for cooking, heating, and lighting. Even the simple act of  being outdoors 
becomes fraught with danger for women and girls in some places when the sun goes down and there 
are no streetlights.75
Accordingly, the economic and social benefits of  access to electricity provide the greatest private return 
to women.76 There is strong empirical support linking access to electricity with improvements to female 
labor outcomes77 and service-provision, particularly maternal health.78
At the firm level, the notorious unreliability79 of  electricity and the prevalence of  outages in the region 
represent significant welfare losses.80 Frequent power outages result in significant losses in terms of  forego-
ne sales and damaged equipment. Firms experiencing frequent power outages, defined as more than sixty 
days per year, lose 10-12% of  their sales, twice as much as firms that have fewer than fifteen outages per 
year.81 Equipment damage traceable to power outages is about twice as high for firms that suffer frequent 
outages as for firms that suffer few outages.82 Loses due to power outages are equivalent to 6% of  turnover 
on average for firms in the former sector and as much as 16% of  turnover for informal sector enterprises 
that lack backup generators.83 
These costs have significant implications for international investment and business development. In 
most countries in sub-Saharan Africa, infrastructure accounts for 30-60% of  the effect of  investment clima-
te on firm productivity.84 In half  of  the countries analyzed, the power sector accounted for 40-80% of  the 
infrastructure effect.85 According to the World Bank, over half  of  firms in Africa identify poor availability 
of  electricity as a major constraint for doing business.86 Ultimately, the extension and provision of  reliable 
electricity serves as a catalyst for increased firm productivity and gross revenue gains.87
Powering human rights
With a more normative focus, the literature has also advocated that access to reliable, sustainable, and 
affordable electricity be provided as public good as well as conceptualized and incorporated into the human 
74  See Ngai, supra note 53, at 581-82; Tully, supra note 56, at 538-39.
75  Ellen-Johnson Sirleaf, Let’s Power Africa, foreign policy (Aug. 29, 2013), Available in:<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/arti-
cles/2013/08/29/let_s_power_africa_ellen_johnson_sirleaf_liberia_energy>.
76  See Chineke & Ezike, supra note 9, at 683; Brass et al., supra note 64, at 117.
77  See, e.g., Taryn Dinkelman, The Effects of  Rural Electrification on Employment: New Evidence from South Africa, 101 am. econ. rev. 
3078, 3078 (2011).
78  See, e.g., D. Claus, Involving the User: Community Based Management of  Solar Home Systems in Indonesia, 2 refocus 18, 18; Tully, supra 
note 56, at 551.
79  See supra notes 32-35. 
80  See Foster & Steinbucks, supra note 54, at 2; Golumbeanu & Barnes, supra note 27, at 4.
81  Foster & Steinbucks, supra note 54, at 13.
82  Id.
83  eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 7.
84  Id. at 17-18.
85 Id.
86  Sokona et al., supra note 18, at 7.
87  See generally C. Kirubi et al., Community-based Electric Micro Grids can Contribute to Rural Development: Evidence from Kenya, 37 world 
dev. 1208 (2009).  But see Brass et al., supra note 64, at 117 (gathering literature that is skeptical of  the relationship between distrib-
uted generation provision and new economic opportunities).
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rights framework.88 By conceptualizing access to electricity as a human right, pressure could be brought to 
bear at the national and international level for recognition of  access to energy services as integral to the 
realization of  the vast bulk of  existing socio-economic rights.89 Several states have recognized that electricity 
access may qualify as a human right. For example, French legislation “contributes to social cohesion by satis-
fying everyone’s right to electricity.”90 South African law imposes duties upon electricity service providers to 
supply electricity “to every applicant who is in a position to make satisfactory arrangements for payment.”91 
This obligation has been interpreted to mean that applicants enjoy a prima facie right entitling them to de-
mand electricity once they have satisfied such supply conditions.92
Although the major human rights instruments are silent on the point of  access to electricity, the literature 
argues that it is an implicit attribute of  a number of  human rights, including non-discrimination, adequate 
living standards, housing, health, and sustainable development.93 This line of  argument draws from the In-
ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which requires that party states 
“recognize the right of  everyone to an adequate standard of  living . . . including adequate food, clothing 
and housing, and to the continuous improvement of  living conditions”94 and the Universal Declaration of  
Human Rights, which contains an identical list.95 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR), responsible for overseeing the implementation of  the ICESCR, expects party states to periodically 
submit information on household amenities such as heating and electricity.96 Within this framework, electrici-
ty is principally considered under the right to adequate housing.97 For instance, the Special Rapporteur on ade-
quate housing has construed his mandate broadly such that this right includes access to essential civic services 
such as electricity.98 Furthermore, at the national level, the South African Constitutional Court concluded 
that the right to adequate housing includes “access to services such as water, sewage, electricity and roads.”99
Additionally, access to electricity has been explicitly recognized in the context of  eliminating discrimina-
tion against women.100 Article 14(2)(h) of  the Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Discrimina-
tion Against Women (CEDAW) are obligated to “take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in rural areas . . . and, in particular, shall ensure to such women the right . . . to enjoy adequate 
living conditions, particularly in relation to housing, sanitation, electricity and water supply, transport and 
communications.”101 Ultimately, given the exigency of  energy poverty in sub-Saharan Africa, the positive 
economic and normative arguments in support of  access to electricity, and the lack of  initial reform success, 
developing a new approach to power sector reform is indeed a critical development objective. 
88  See Brew-Hammond & Kemausuor, supra note 4, at 83; Tully, supra note 56, at 518; Tully, supra note 61, at 557; Stephen Tully, 
The Human Right to Access Electricity, 19 elecTriciTy J., no. 3, 2006, at 30-31; Ngai, supra note 53, at 526.
89  Bradbrook et al., supra note 55, at 529.
90  Electricity Act, art. 1 (2000) (Fr.).
91   Electricity Act 41 of  1987 § 10(1) (1987) (S. Afr.).
92  Tully, supra note 56, at 545 (citing Meyer v Moqhaka Local Municipality, Case No 4008/2003, 24 (S. Afr. High Ct., Orange Free 
State Provincial Div.) (unreported per Rampai, J.)).
93  Ngai, supra note 54, at 606; Stephen Tully, The Human Right to Access Clean Energy, 3 J. green Building 140 (2008); Bradbrook 
& Gardam, supra note 67, at 405; Tully, supra note 88, at 30, 38.
94  Int’l Covenant on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, art. 11(1), 993 UNTS 3 (adopted Dec. 16, 1966 and entered into force Jan. 
3, 1976).
95  Universal Declaration of  Human Rights, art. 25.
96  Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Revised General Guidelines Regarding the Form and Contents of  Reports to be 
Submitted by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of  the ICESCR, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1991/1 (June 17, 1991).
97  U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 4 on the Right to Adequate Housing Contained in 
Art XI(1) of  the ICESCR, ¶ 8(b), U.N. Doc. E/1992/23 (Dec. 13, 1991).
98  U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Report of  the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of  the right to an adequate 
standard of  living, ¶¶ 35, 46(b), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/59 (Mar. 1, 2002) (prepared by Miloon Kothari).
99  Gov’t of  the Republic of  S. Afr. v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), ¶ 37 (S. Afr.).
100  See Tully, supra note 88, at 38; Ngai, supra note 53, at 606; Lisa R. Pruitt, Deconstructing CEDAW’s Article 14: Naming and Explain-
ing Rural Difference, 17 wm. & mary J. women & l. 347, 359-60 (2011); Bradbrook et al. , supra note 55, at 536-37.
101  Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Discrimination Against Women, art. 14(2)(h), G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. 
GAOR Supp. No. 46, 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (adopted Dec. 18, 1979 and entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).
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3. thE powEr AfrIcA InItIAtIvE
President Obama unveiled the Power Africa Initiative on June 30, 2013 in Cape Town, South Africa.102 
Power Africa seeks to double access to power in sub-Saharan Africa by adding more than 10,000 MW of  
clean, efficient electricity generation capacity over the next five years.103 Drawing on the considerable energy 
resources of  the region, Power Africa seeks to unlock the substantial wind, solar, hydropower, natural gas, 
and geothermal resources in the region through expanding mini-grid and off-grid solutions, and building 
out power generation, transmission, and distribution structures.104 Accordingly, Power Africa aims to make 
electricity access available for 20 million people and commercial entities.105 In the first phase, Power Africa 
will partner with six nations: Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, and Tanzania, the so-called “Power 
Six”.106 These countries were selected because they have set ambitious goals in electric power generation, 
and are making utility and energy sector reforms to pave the way for investment and growth.107 Power 
Africa will also partner with Uganda and Mozambique on responsible oil and gas resources management.108 
Thus, Power Africa confers a number of  environmental benefits by not only moving the region away from 
traditional biomass that results in deforestation and higher emissions of  greenhouse gases,109 but also by 
leveraging the region’s copious renewable energy resources that have a considerably lower carbon footprint.
Power Africa stands out as a truly unique and innovative development program due to the leveraging 
of  public, private, and multilateral actors, in addition to an emphasis on collaboration with African gover-
nments. The regional headquarters of  Power Africa is Nairobi, Kenya, making Power Africa the first Pre-
sidential Initiative ever to be based outside the United States.110 Over the next five years, the United States 
plans to direct up to $7 billion in government resources; this commitment has already been over-fulfilled 
with approximately $7.8 billion in funding commitments declared by five federal agencies.111 The lion’s share 
of  the governmental resources will be administered through the Export-Import Bank of  the United States 
(EXIM) to support American exports for the development of  power projects.112 EXIM’s specific mandate in 
sub-Saharan Africa is to support American job growth by providing American companies with collateral for 
loans in areas too risky to otherwise operate through two main financial instruments: direct loans and 100% 
loan guarantees.113 The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), the United States Government’s 
development finance institution, has pledged $1.5 billion to finance and insure African energy projects.114 
102  See The whiTe house, supra note 13; USAID, supra note 14; David Nakamura, In Cape Town Speech, Obama to Announce 
‘Power Africa’ Program, wash. posT (June 30, 2013, 6:13 a.m.), Available in: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/
wp/2013/06/30/obama-to-announce-electrical-access-program-for-africa/>.
103  See USAID, supra note 14; Morgan Bazilian & Roger Pielke, Jr., Making Energy Access Meaningful, issues sci. & Tech., Summer 
2013, at 77.
104  See USAID, supra note 14; Shamarukh Mohiuddin, Expanding the Role of  Microfinance in Promoting Renewable Energy Access in 
Developing Countries, 11 geo. puB. pol’y rev. 119, 120 (2005) (noting the synergy between renewable energies and mini-grid and 
off-grid technologies).
105  See USAID, supra note 14; The whiTe house, supra note 13.
106  See The whiTe house, supra note 13; Tony O. Elumelu, Chairman of  Heirs Holdings & the Tony Elumelu Found., Testimony 
before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations at the Hearing on the Power Africa Initiative (Mar. 26, 2014).
107  See The whiTe house, supra note 13; Paul Hinks, Chief  Exec. Officer of  Symbion Power, Comments at Chadborne & Parke’s 
Fourth Annual Focus on Emerging Markets Conference (Mar. 20, 2014) (hereinafter “Chadbourne Conference”).
108  See The whiTe house, supra note 13.
109  See supra notes 69-73. 
110  See Earl Gast, Assistant Adm’r for Afr., U.S. Agency for Int’l  Dev., Testimony before the United States Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations at the Hearing on the Power Africa Initiative (Mar. 26, 2014) (hereinafter “USAID Testimony”); Yvone Kawira, 
Nairobi to Host US’s Power Africa Project, daily naTion (Nov. 20, 2013), http://mobile.nation.co.ke/business/Nairobi-to-host-US-
Power-Africa-project/-/1950106/2081840/-/format/xhtml/-/13kv0m3/-/index.html; Chadbourne Conference, supra note 107.
111  See Kenneth W. Hansen & Rachel Rosenfeld, Powering Africa, proJecT finance newswire (Chadbourne & Parke LLP), Aug. 
2013, at 8.
112  See Chadbourne Conference, supra note 107.
113  See id.
114  OPIC Testimony, supra note 11.
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OPIC already has a pipeline of  African electricity projects that, if  fully committed, would surpass their 
commitment.115 The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) has committed $1 billion through its coun-
try compacts to encourage new power genera tion, transmission, and distribution projects.116 MCC will also 
invest in energy infrastructure, policy and regulatory reforms and host government capacity building.117 The 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has pledged $285 million to be focused on 
technical assistance and risk mitigation through mechanisms such as country-specific transaction advisers, 
as well as encouraging private sector transactions through direct grant financing and loan guarantees throu-
gh their Development Credit Authority.118 OPIC and the United States Trade and Development Agency 
(USTDA) jointly com mitted to make available up to $20 million in project prepara tion, feasibility study, and 
technical assistance grants to support the development of  renewable energy projects.119 Lastly, the United 
States African Development Foundation has launched a $2 million Off-Grid Energy Challenge to provide 
grants of  up to $100,000 to African-owned enterprises.120
The private sector focus has distinguished Power Africa as a new model for development in action.121 At 
the time of  this paper, the private sector founding partners have pledged to develop nearly ten GW of  critical 
generation projects in five of  the Power Africa countries, resulting in over $14.7 billion in investment in these 
countries’ power sectors.122 Private sector partners are also focused on mini-grid and distributed power services 
and infrastructure. Commitments sum to 700,000 new households and businesses served and over $1.1 billion 
in investment.123 This emphasis on IPPs constitutes an important form of  private sector participation in Africa’s 
power sector. With demand outstripping supply in many African countries, independent power projects are be-
coming a major source of  new power generation capacity in these countries.124 Additionally, participation of  the 
private sector is important when electrifying remote villages, particularly with stand-alone systems.125 
Accordingly, the United States has a keen economic interest in Power Africa, namely, that many of  the 
sponsors and developers of  these energy and power projects are American companies. Several United States 
governmental agencies with significant involvement in Power Africa have institutional mandates to speci-
fically support American companies.126 Thus, while altruism and developmental goals are important, the 
potential for successful implementation increases due to the economic stake of  American business in Power 
Africa. However, given the high level of  American involvement through a predominantly free-market, priva-
te-sector driven approach, Power Africa could simply resemble another example of  the broader neoliberal 
development paradigm that has been critiqued as benefiting developed nations at the expense of  developing 
nations.127 For instance, Power Africa has already been criticized for being a mechanism to “grease up” bi-
llions of  dollars worth of  deals for American corporations, such as General Electric.128
115  Id.
116  See Hansen & Rosenfeld, supra note 111, at 9.
117  Id.
118  See Chadbourne Conference, supra note 107.
119  See Hansen & Rosenfeld, supra note 111, at 9.
120  Id.
121  See USAID Testimony, supra note 110; Chadbourne Conference, supra note 107.
122  u.s. agency for inT’l dev., Private Sector. Available in: <http://www.usaid.gov/powerafrica/partners/private-sector>. 
(last visited July 25, 2014).
123  Id. 
124  Karekezi & Kimani, supra note 26, at 927.
125  Id. See also inT’l energy agency (iea), comparaTive sTudy on rural elecTrificaTion policies in emerging economies 
100 (2010).
126  See supra notes 112-14. For instance, the OPIC requires a US nexus in order to qualify for a downstream loan. See Available 
in:<http://www.opic.gov/sites/default/files/files/040313-callforproposals.pdf>.
127  See generally david harvey, a Brief hisTory of neoliBeralism (2005); andre gunder franK, capiTalism and underde-
velopmenT in laTin america (1967); fernando henriQue cardoso & enzo faleTTo, dependency and developmenT in laTin 
america (1979); J. Samuel Valenzuela & Arturo Valenzuela, Modernization and Dependency: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of  Latin 
American Underdevelopment, 10 comp. pol , no. 4, 1978.
128  Christopher Helman, Obama’s ‘Power Africa’ Plan Greases Billions in Deals for General Electric, forBes (July 1, 2013, 12:39 P.M.), 
Available in: <http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2013/07/01/with-power-africa-plan-obama-to-grease-billions-
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Although Power Africa does not require implementing legislation, the Electrify Africa Act of  2013129 
(the Act) was introduced in the House of  Representatives days before President Obama’s announcement in 
Cape Town. The purpose of  the Act is to “establish a comprehensive United States Government policy to 
assist countries in sub-Saharan Africa to develop an appropriate mix of  power solutions for more broadly 
distributed electricity access in order to support poverty alleviation and drive economic growth, and for 
other purposes.”130 Congress declares that it is the policy of  the United States to:
(1) encourage the installation of  at least an additional 20,000 megawatts of  electrical power in sub-
Saharan Africa by 2020; (2) promote first-time access to electricity for at least 50,000,000 people in sub-
Saharan Africa by 2020 in both urban and rural areas; and (3) promote efficient institutional platforms 
to provide electrical service to rural and underserved areas.131 
Although the Act largely provides guidelines to USAID, OPIC, and USTDA that are already underway 
as part of  the Initiative, the Act importantly amends the Foreign Assistance Act of  1961132 to direct the 
Board of  Directors and the President of  OPIC to issue policy guidance that permits significant investment 
in the electricity sector of  the poorest and lowest pollution-emitting countries in a development-driven and 
environmentally sensitive manner.133 This amendment provides OPIC with an exception to invest in energy 
projects that involve fossil fuels, which otherwise conflicts with OPIC’s internal directive that caps the total 
greenhouse gas emissions in their overall investment portfolio.134
At a fundamental level, Power Africa seeks to extend access to reliable, sustainable, and affordable 
electricity through a concurrent top-down and bottom-up approach that is widely embraced by the litera-
ture.135 On the centralized track, electrification is undertaken by national governmental entities such as the 
state-owned national utility, a rural electrification agency (REA), or the ministry of  energy, acting alone 
or together.136 Electrification occurs primarily through extension of  the national grid.137 In contrast, on 
the decentralized track, electrification is generally carried out through nongovernmental entities such as 
cooperatives, community user groups, or private entrepreneurs.138 The decentralized model incorporates a 
number of  different systems for electricity generation including isolated mini-grids that are a combination 
of  a generating unit and a distribution system that operates separately from the national or regional grids 
and connected mini-grids that are distribution systems that are connected to, and may draw electricity from, 
the main grid.139 This dual track emphasis, combined with the leveraging of  private sector investment in 
the generation, distribution, and transmission of  electricity in order to meet demand, epitomizes the use of  
non-traditional mechanisms to increase access to electricity, particularly in rural areas that face the highest 
costs in accessing the national grid.140
However, while innovative, the structure of  Power Africa is rife with implementation challenges. At the 
core of  this multi-actor public-private partnership are looming concerns with respect to whether African 
governments can create a favorable and financially sustainable investment climate for private capital, and a 
legal and regulatory environment that not only allows investments to be profit-generating and commercially 
in-deals-for-g-e/>. 
129  Electrify Africa Act of  2013, H.R. 2548, 113th Congress (2013).
130  Id.
131  Id. § 4.
132  Foreign Assistance Act of  1961, Pub. L. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424-2 (1961).
133  Electrify Africa Act, supra note 129, § 8(c).
134  Bazilian & Pielke, Jr., supra note 103, at 78; Todd moss & BenJamin leo, cTr. for gloBal dev., maximizing access To 
energy: esTimaTes of access and generaTion for The overseas privaTe invesTmenT corporaTion’s porTfolio 1-4 (2014).
135  See, e.g., TenenBaum eT al., supra note 60, at 1; Sokona et al., supra note 18, at 8; eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 103.
136  See TenenBaum eT al., supra note 60, at 1, 19, 28.
137  Id.
138  Id. at 1, 20, 28.
139  Id. at 43. Much of  the nomenclature for this technology varies by region. Generally speaking, the term “mini-grid” is inter-
changeable with “small power producer” (SPP) and distributed generation (DG). 
140  See Centurelli, supra note 18, at 234-35.
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sustainable, but also provides the proper incentives and policy mechanisms for African households and 
businesses to afford accessing electricity. Furthermore, the dual centralized/decentralized nature of  Power 
Africa foments questions of  the political, legal, policy, and fiscal dynamics between national and subnational 
governments of  African states as the centralized and decentralized electrification tracks are concurrently 
implemented and balanced. The next section develops these concerns in detail, drawing on the political eco-
nomy and international development literatures in order to identify how variations of  institutional capacity 
and autonomy present a substantial challenge to the implementation of  Power Africa. 
4. A thEory of stAtE In(cApAcIty) And ElEctrIfIcAtIon
Institutional design, governance, and public goods 
This paper emphasizes the causal link between state capacity, state-society relations, and the creation of  
institutional and regulatory obstacles that represent significant implementation challenges to Power Africa. 
There is a considerable and growing literature that focuses on the effects of  political regimes and institu-
tional quality on public goods provision. Much of  this literature focuses on the effect of  regime type on 
human capital formation and social policies that affect human capital, specifically health and education. The 
literature overwhelmingly concludes that democratic regimes provide more services that produce improved 
health and education outcomes141 and make larger fiscal commitments to the health and education sec-
tors.142 For instance, Stasavage addresses the effects of  electoral competition on total, primary, and tertiary 
education spending in forty-four African nations from 1980 to 1996, finding that the shift to multiparty 
competition has resulted in increased total education spending by 1.1% of  GDP and 4.4% of  total public 
expenditures.143 More specifically focusing on the quality of  formal political institutions, physical capital, 
and infrastructure, Brower finds a statistically significant and robust relationship between the presence of  
high-functioning, democratic institutions and road density in sub-Saharan Africa.144
Merely a year into Power Africa, African governments have already been identified as a major obstacle to 
private sector power investment under Power Africa, both in terms of  navigating African bureaucracies145 
and dealing with an unfriendly regulatory environment.146 These obstacles speak to the broader issue of  
governance, which is not only emerging as an international law issue that could take the shape of  an erga 
omnes obligation,147 but also a central issue for the implementation of  Power Africa specifically and the de-
velopment of  energy infrastructure more broadly in sub-Saharan Africa.148 Hyden defines governance as
141  See generally Matthew Baum & David Lake, The Political Economy of  Growth: Democracy and Human Capital, 42 am. 
J. pol. sci., no. 2, 2003; David Lake & Matthew Baum, The Invisible Hand of  Democracy: Political Control and the Provision of  
Public Services, 34 comp. pol. sTud., no. 6, 2001; Mohsen Fardmanesh & Nader Habibi, What is Vulnerable During Fiscal Re-
trenchment?, 12 econ. & pol., no. 1, 2000.
142  See generally David Brown & Wendy Hunter, Democracy and Human Capital Formation: Education Spending in Latin 
America, 1980-1997, 37 comp. pol. sTud., no. 7, 2004; Robert Kaufman & Alexa Segura-Ubiergo, Globalization, Domestic Poli-
tics, and Social Spending in Latin America, 53 world pol., no. 4, 2001;  Barry ames, poliTical survival: poliTicians and puBlic 
policy in laTin america (1987).
143  See generally David Stasavage, Democracy and Education Spending in Africa, 49 am. J. pol. sci., no. 2,  2005; David Stasav-
age, The Role of  Democracy in Uganda’s Move to Primary Education, 43 J. modern afr. sTud., no. 1, 2005.
144  Tom Brower, The Road Less Traveled: Institutional Quality and Road Provision in sub-Saharan Africa 17-19 (Apr. 28, 2012) 
(unpublished M.A. thesis, Indiana University) (on file with author and Indiana University Library system).
145  See, e.g., supra note 16.
146  Karambu, supra note 16; see also TenenBaum eT al., supra note 60, at 86.
147  Thomas francK, fairness in inTernaTional law 83-84 (1995).
148  See Francis N. Botchway, The Role of  the State in the Context of  Good Governance and Electricity Management: Compara-
tive Antecedents and Current Trends, 21 u. pa. J. inT’l econ. l. 781, 782-83 (2000) (“the critical variable for the success or failure 
of  government participation is the presence or substantial absence of  the tenets of  good governance.”).
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that aspect of  politics that aims to formulate and manage the rules of  the political arena in which 
state and civil society actors operate and interact to make authoritative decisions. In more operational 
terms, governance refers to those measures that involve setting the rules for the exercise of  power and 
settling conflicts over such rules. Such rules translate into constitutions, laws, customs, administrative 
regulations, and international agreements, all of  which in one way or the other provide the framework 
for the formulation and implementation of  policy decisions.149
However, the concept of  governance is murky and typically operationalized in an overbroad fashion, 
making it an unwieldy concept to subject to focused empirical analysis. Most of  the work on governance 
appears satisfied with a description or provision of  a shopping list of  ingredients for good governance, such 
as accountability, transparency, anti-corruption, rule of  law, advancement for women, democracy, and decen-
tralization.150 Accordingly, this paper draws upon two distinct and interrelated aspects of  state capacity in or-
der to provide a more concrete and institution-focused theoretical framework: absolute state capacity, which fo-
cuses on the extent to which the state bureaucracy is apolitical and technocratic, and relative state capacity, which 
focuses on the degree of  autonomy that state institutions have vis-à-vis particularistic societal interests.151
Absolute State Capacity
Unsurprisingly, absolute state capacity developed out of  the political economy literature that sought to open 
the “black box” of  the state and analytically focus on the institutional structures and dynamics within the state 
apparatus itself.152 Absolute state capacity is “the measure of  the ability of  a government to implement its 
policies and accomplish its goals.”153 The concept of  state capacity is multi-dimensional; it is constituted by: 
(1) regulatory capacity: the ability of  the state to establish and enforce the rules that guide, or regulate, 
social behavior; (2) administrative capacity: the routine ability to manage the personnel and resources of  
the state and ensure accountability and efficiency in service delivery; (3) technical capacity: the expertise 
and knowledge required to make and implement technical decisions. . . as well as the policy tools and 
instruments necessary to implement those decisions effectively; and (4) extractive capacity, the ability of  
the state to raise the revenues it needs to pay for the expenses of  implementing its policies and goals.154
Of  these four dimensions, regulatory capacity and administrative capacity are of  greatest importance due to 
the ability of  bilateral and multilateral donors to provide technical and financial assistance to overcome a dearth 
of  technological expertise and revenue shortfalls.155 This is consistent with USAID’s provision of  technical assis-
tance and risk mitigation through mechanisms such as country-specific transaction advisers in Power Africa.156
Regulatory capacity largely focuses on the promotion of  the rule of  law.157 Although the rule of  law is an ex-
149  Goran Hyden, Governance and the Reconstitution of  Political Order, in sTaTe, conflicT and democracy in africa 185 
(Richard Joseph ed., 1999). See also goran hyden & michael BraTTon, governance and poliTics in africa 7 (1993) (defining 
governance as “the conscious management of  regime structures with a view to enhancing the legitimacy of  the public realm”).
150  See Botchway, supra note 148, at 161.
151  See d. michael shafer, winners and losers: how secTors shape The developmenTal prospecTs of sTaTes 13-18 (1994). 
152  See generally Peter Evans, The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural Change, in The poliTics of 
economic adJusTmenT (Stephen Haggard & Robert Kaufman, eds. 1992); Bringing The sTaTe BacK in (Peter Evans et al., eds. 1985). 
153  Deborah Brautigam, State Capacity and Effective Governance, in agenda for africa’s economic renewal 83 (Benno Ndulu & 
Nicolas van de Walle, eds. 1996).  
154  Id.
155  See Tom Brower, Presentation at the Virginia Social Science Association Annual Conference: State Capacity Formation as 
Functions of  Economic Crisis and International Actors: Ghana 1981-1992 (Apr. 5, 2004) (on file with author); eBerhard eT al., 
supra note 4, at 92. 
156  See USAID, supra note 14.
157  See Nsongurua J. Udombana, Articulating the Right to Democratic Governance in Africa, 24 mich. J. inT’l l. 1209, 1231 (2003) 
(contending that “[g]ood governance . . . must also be effective and equitable, in order to promote the rule of  law”). 
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pansive concept158 that can refer to sets of  rules that bind governments and individuals,159 the presence and 
quality of  specific legal or political institutions,160 or the adequate protection of  equality or human rights,161 
at its core, the rule of  law has focused on subjecting the government to the same laws as ordinary people.162 
Thus, the creation of  institutional structures and mechanisms that establish a transparent, accountable, and 
stable state apparatus enhances a state’s regulatory capacity. In the context of  energy policy, which is charac-
terized by long time horizons and requiring considerable capital investments that are illiquid ex post, investors 
need broad national stability grounded in the rule of  law.163 Thus, as regulatory capacity decreases, higher 
incidences of  policy reversal and governmental arbitrariness represent significant political risks for private 
sector investors of  Power Africa. If  African governments create arbitrary policies that fail to make rural 
electrification profitable in the long-term for IPPs, Power Africa’s chances for successful implementation 
plummet. Furthermore, because they often operate as off-takers to power purchase agreements (PPAs), the 
contracts that ensure a reliable stream of  income for IPPs, it is essential that African governments remain 
accountable as contractual partners for Power Africa investors.
Administrative capacity focuses on the extent to which the state bureaucracy is insulated and autonomous 
from the rest of  the politicized, and often particularistic, state apparatus. Accordingly, bureaucracies with 
high administrative capacity are characterized as apolitical, technocratic, meritocratic, and independent. The-
se institutions ideally approximate the Weberian bureaucracy, the administrative apparatus that ensures the 
inherent guarantee of  reliable formal expectations of  the political authority without becoming integrated or 
identified with the politicians that operates based on legal-rational authority.164 The bureaucratic ethic of  te-
chnical skill and sense of  duty over personal views165 is an essential requirement for the inevitable regulation 
of  an industry as technical as energy, and has wide ranging national and international implications.166 For 
instance, the International Energy Agency identifies dedicated institutional structures that are independent 
from political agendas and electrification objectives that are not interfered with according to politicians’ 
personal agendas as preconditions for successful rural electrification policies.167 In the context of  Power 
Africa, the state bureaucracy is responsible for establishing the regulatory framework that determines both 
the price at which energy is purchased from IPPs, how subsidies are structured, and the consumer’s cost 
of  connection to the grid. If  the bureaucracy is politicized, these regulatory policies may be structured to 
both be financially unsustainable for IPPs and prevent consumers without access to electricity from gaining 
it. Politicization additionally further crystallizes existing cleavages and perpetuates existing infrastructural 
differences, preventing Power Africa from reaching its primary goal of  an extension of  electricity access. 
Technical capacity refers to the skill and expertise required to implement state policy. In the context of  
energy infrastructure and rural electrification, technical capacity largely rests with the electricity regulators. 
Electricity regulators make three types of  regulatory decisions: economic, technical, and process.168 Econo-
158  See Rachel Kleinfeld, Competing Definitions of  the Rule of  Law, in promoTing The rule of law aBroad: in search of Knowl-
edge 31 (Thomas Carothers, ed. 2006). For a taxonomy of  various rule of  law concepts, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of  Law” 
as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 colum. l. rev. 1, 11-24 (1997); see generally William C. Whitford, The Rule of  Law, 2000 Wis. 
L. Rev. 723, 724 (2000).
159  Kleinfeld, supra note 158, at 36-44.
160  Id. at 47-48.
161  Id. at 44-46; See Brian z. Tamanaha, on The rule of law: hisTory, poliTics, Theory 91-113 (2004) (comparing formalist 
and substantive theories on the rule of  law). 
162  See Botchway, supra note 148, at 196; Whitford, supra note 158, at 724 (“The Rule of  Law ideal, therefore, has come to mean 
that government discretion must be bounded by standards that set effective limits on the exercise of  that discretion.”).
163  See Botchway, supra note 148, at 198.
164  max weBer, economy and socieTy: an ouTline of inTerpreTive sociology 31(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich, eds., 
Eprhaim Fischoff  et al., trans. 1968).
165  Id. at 456-58.
166  See Botchway, supra note 148, at 170.
167  IEA, supra note 125, at 9.
168  TenenBaum eT al., supra note 60, at 66, 69.
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mic or commercial decisions gravitate around price setting and identifying the paying entity.169 The regula-
tory decision that is the center of  attention is the feed-in-tariff, the price that a grid-connected IPP receives 
for the power that it sells to the national or regional utility, which is critical for the IPP’s economic vitality. 
A technical decision is usually an engineering decision, such as the technical standards in the interconnec-
tion agreement that provide for safe and robust electrical connections between the national utility and a 
grid-connected IPP.170 While technical in substance, these regulatory decisions have important economic 
impacts. For example, Thailand requires only a few standard relays for interconnection of  small induction 
generators to the national grid, whereas regulators in other countries may require more extensive and expen-
sive protection equipment.171 The cost of  these technical decisions and the ability of  the regulator to make 
effective choices may seriously affect the commercial viability of  energy projects. Lastly, a process decision 
specifies the process by which the regulator’s technical and economic decisions are made and enforced.172 
Even if  the regulator sets a price that ensures economic viability, the regulatory system and underlying 
transactions may still fail if  the specified decision-making process involves too many steps, if  government 
entities ignore their responsibilities, or if  the regulator fails to enforce its decisions in a timely manner.173 The 
concern over the regulatory process vis-à-vis Power Africa was evident during President Obama’s speech at 
the Ubungo Symbion Power Plant in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, where he noted a “sense of  urgency” with 
respect to electrifying African with “more speed” by “cut[ting] through the red tape.”174
Lastly, extractive capacity focuses on the state’s ability to finance its policies through revenue generation. 
Compared with other developing regions, sub-Saharan Africa’s public financing capabilities are characte-
rized by particularly weak tax revenue collection. Domestic revenue generation of  approximately 23% of  
GDP trails averages for other developing countries and is the lowest for low-income countries at less than 
15% of  GDP a year.175 Administrative corruption and tax evasion are among the most pressing problems 
for many African states,176 with, in some cases, more than half  of  all taxes going uncollected.177 Despite high 
growth rates in the last decade, domestically-raised revenue grew by less than 1.2% of  GDP, suggesting that 
raising domestic revenue above current levels would require undertaking challenging institutional reforms to 
increase the effectiveness of  revenue collection and broaden the tax base.178 As a result, considerable power 
funding gaps exist in sub-Saharan Africa. The most severe cases are Ethiopia, a “Power Six” country, and 
the Democratic Republic of  Congo, which have annual gaps of  23% of  GDP ($2.8 billion) and 18% ($1.3 
billion), respectively.179 However, in the case of  Power Africa, which is driven by private sector investment, 
the public financing gap is considerably less problematic. 
Relative state capacity
In addition to determining the level of  internal state insulation, political institutions also determine the 
extent to which certain social groups are able to influence policy. Relative state capacity differs from absolute 
state capacity primarily with respect to its unit of  analysis. Relative state capacity comes from the state-socie-
169  Id. at 67.
170  Id. at 66.
171  Id. at 67.
172  Id.
173  Id. at 67-68.
174  The whiTe house, Remarks by President Obama at Ubungo Symbion Power Plant (July 2, 2013, 10:58 A.M. EAT). Avail-
able in: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2013/07/02/president-obama-speaks-ubungo-symbion-power-
plant#transcript>; Hinks Testimony, supra note 15.
175  eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 167.
176  See roBerT KliTgaard, conTrolling corrupTion 6 (1988).
177  See Richard M. Bird, The Administrative Dimension of  Tax Reform in Developing Countries, in lessons from Tax reform in devel-
oping counTries 316 (Malcolm Gillis, ed. 1989).
178  eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 167.
179  Id. at 164-65.
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ty relations literature.180 Instead of  focusing on the internal structure and autonomy of  the state apparatus, 
relative state capacity focuses on the autonomy that the state apparatus has vis-à-vis particularistic societal 
interests. This paper defines relative state capacity as “the extent to which leaders are organizationally capa-
ble of  insulting themselves from societal pressures by controlling channels of  interest representation and 
autonomously defining national tasks.”181 
One of  the most significant characteristics of  the energy crisis in sub-Saharan Africa is the significant dispa-
rity between urban and rural levels of  electrification.182 While most tropical African economies are dependent 
upon the production and export of  agricultural products, there is constant pressure to generate higher levels 
of  income and higher standards of  living. The natural solution is a shift from an agricultural-based economy 
to an industrial-based economy that focuses on labor- and capital-intensive goods and services. In addition to 
furthering this broad development goal, a regime seeks to remain in power to accumulate resources. These two 
assumptions are at the core of  the urban bias problem in sub-Saharan Africa. First developed by Lipton, urban 
bias describes the pathological practice of  government favoring the urban sector in development policy:
[t]he rural sector contains most of  the poverty, and most of  the low-cost sources of  potential advance; 
but the urban sector contains most of  the articulateness, organisation and power. So the urban classes 
have been able to “win” most of  the rounds of  the struggle with the countryside; but in so doing they 
have made the development process needlessly slow and unfair.183
Urban areas represent the most exigent threat to a regime’s survival due to their geographical concen-
tration and proximity to major government and communication centers, particularly the capital city. These 
threats manifest in the form of  strikes, riots, and military coups. This is juxtaposed to rural areas, which face 
significant geographical distances and relatively higher collective action costs, and therefore are less likely to 
effectively organize against the state.184 African states face pressure from two sets of  actors: urban workers 
demanding low prices goods; and urban employers, who, when faced with higher prices, must pay higher 
wages to workers. The fundamental issue driving urban unrest concerns the real value of  urban incomes and 
the erosion of  purchasing power.185 Accordingly, abating the militancy of  urban consumers is a state priority. 
As a result, African states intervene in major economic markets, creating policies that benefit urban areas, 
but negatively affect rural areas, namely the agrarian sector. The agrarian sector is consequently squeezed in 
order to generate the necessary savings for urban-focused investment.186 Rural-centric policy is thus parado-
xically devised as a means to cope with urban issues. This urban bias extends into the power sector and ope-
rates as a core causal mechanism to understanding the obstacles facing the implementation of  Power Africa.
Low levels of  relative state capacity and the presence of  urban bias significantly limit the success of  
Power Africa through the reification of  the extant inequity of  access to electricity in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Motivated by a desire to maintain their purchasing power, urban areas will pressure the government for po-
180  See generally Joel s. migdal, sTrong socieTies and weaK sTaTes: sTaTe-socieTy relaTions and sTaTe capaBiliTies in The 
Third world (1988); civil socieTy and The sTaTe in africa (John Harbeson et al., eds. 1994).
181  Stephan Haggard & Chung-In Moon, The South Korean State in the International Economy, in The anTimonies of inTerdepend-
ence 141 (John Ruggie, ed. 1983).  
182  See supra notes 9, 26-31.
183  Michael Lipton, Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World Development 13 (1977); see also Robert H. Bates, Markets 
and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of  Agricultural Policies 81-95 (1981) (discussing African states’ favoritism of  ur-
ban over rural constituencies); see generally Robert Eastwood, Johann Kirsten, & Michael Lipton, Premature Deagriculturalisation? Land 
Inequality and Rural Dependency in Limpopo Province, South Africa, 42 J. Dev. Stud. 1325 (2006) (drawing on recent research). Urban bias 
overlaps with the notion of  ruralism. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Poverty and Global Ruralism, 13 J. Gender Race & Just. 1, 11 (2009). The 
distinction is primarily that urban bias theory is aimed specifically at the allocation of  resources, whereas ruralism encompasses 
resource allocation along with discrimination on a broader scale, including a social bias against rural dwellers. See Debra Lyn Bassett, 
Ruralism, 88 Iowa L. Rev. 273, 280 (2003).
184  See generally Mancur Olson, The Logic of  Collective Action and the Theory of  Groups (1965); Robert Bates, Towards a Politi-
cal Economy of  Development: A Rational Choice Perspective (1988).  
185  Bates, supra note 184, at 346.
186 See generally Michael Todaro, City Bias and Rural Neglect: The Dilemma of  Urban Development (1981).
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licies that make electricity as inexpensive as possible, such as uniform national tariffs and high consumption 
subsidies. In order to deter civil unrest and ensure the survival of  the regime, states with low relative state 
capacity will adopt these policies to placate their urban constituents. In light of  the economic cost of  these 
policies and relatively low levels of  governmental revenue due to low extractive capacity, governments seek 
to cover the residual at the expense of  rural areas. This bias will be increasingly institutionalized over time 
as the locus of  decision-making authority will be centralized in order to be proximate to urban areas. As a 
result, rural electrification projects, such as distributed generation (DG), will lack the autonomy to tailor pro-
jects to local needs, negatively affecting their viability and long-term success. Furthermore, electrifying rural 
areas is inherently a more costly endeavor than electrifying urban areas; accordingly, establishing uniform 
tariffs, though beneficial for urban consumers, effectively marginalizes IPPs focused on rural electrification 
because they will be unable to sustain long-term profits. Since IPP commercial viability is at the crux of  
the success of  Power Africa, failing to provide the proper economic incentives for IPPs due to a systematic 
political bias against rural electrification constitutes a significant implementation challenge.
Argument
This paper contends that low levels of  state capacity, evidenced by a lack of  bureaucratic insulation wi-
thin the state apparatus and a lack of  state autonomy from particularistic social actors, create institutional 
structures and regulatory frameworks that represent significant implementation obstacles to Power Africa. 
Specifically, weak and incapacitated state apparatuses and the presence of  urban bias create implementation 
barriers through three main mechanisms: (1) creating hybrid power markets;187 (2) centralizing power sec-
tor institutions; and (3) creating unfavorable regulatory frameworks. These mechanisms are systematically 
biased against the extension of  electricity into rural areas, marginalize IPPs, and threaten the commercial 
sustainability of  private sector investments.  
Weak institutionalization within the state apparatus has produced neopatrimonial188 states with highly poli-
ticized bureaucracies and centralized electrical power markets led by inefficient and insolvent parastatal organi-
zations; these present significant risks to IPPs due to their lack of  reliability as off-takers. Additionally, the cen-
tralization of  the power sector deters IPPs and local governments from having political and fiscal autonomy 
to tailor power projects to local needs, significantly compromising DG projects. Furthermore, due to low state 
autonomy and urban bias, the hybrid power sector creates a regulatory framework that negatively affects both 
demand-side and supply-side aspects of  rural electrification. The adoption of  ineffective subsidy policies and 
high connection rates deter rural populations from being able to afford electrification. Additionally, suboptimal 
FITs and poorly structured or nonexistent PPAs threaten the commercial sustainability of  IPPs in rural areas. 
The next three sections take up each of  these mechanisms in turn, establishing a causal connection between 
state capacity and institutional and policy barriers to the implementation of  Power Africa.
Institutional power and power institutions in sub-Saharan Africa
w(h)ither the State?
One of  the most important political legacies of  colonialism in Africa has been the reliance on the model 
of  centralized bureaucratic administration, which, like the colonial systems before them, has not effectively 
187  A centralized hybrid power market describes a power sector where incumbent state-owned utilities often retain dominant 
market positions with private sector actors involved on a temporary or highly marginalized basis. See infra notes 203-11.
188  Neopatrimonialism is a system of  social organization where patrons utilize state resources in order to secure the support and 
loyalty of  clients in the general population, expressed in terms of  an informal patron-client relationship between multiple strata of  
society. See infra notes 189-94.
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functioned. A considerable literature has assessed the poor institutionalization and lack of  absolute state 
capacity in sub-Saharan Africa.189 Additionally, in many sub-Saharan African countries, distinctions between 
the state realm and civil society are far from clear, evidence of  low levels of  relative state capacity.190 One of  
the main problems is a loose coupling between the formal bureaucratic structure of  these states and neopa-
trimonial forms of  rule that suggest that personal relationships are more important than formal institutions 
in determining outcomes.191 In discussing the neopatrimonial state, Jackson and Rosberg note that“[b]lack 
Africa’s forty-odd states are among the weakest in the world. State institutions and organizations are less 
developed in the sub-Saharan region than almost anywhere else.”192 Accordingly, many of  Africa’s elites lack 
the capacity to maintain the functions associated with national sovereignty in their territories, such as the 
maintenance of  the rule of  law, regulation of  borders, and provision of  social services.193 Thus, some com-
mentators have contended that African states lack the capacity to even be considered states in the empirical 
sense.194 The prevalence of  state incapacity in sub-Saharan Africa has had significant implications for the in-
completeness of  power sector reform in the region and the institutionalization of  a public sector-controlled 
and politicized power sector, discussed in the following section. 
White elephants on parade
Sub-Saharan Africa has gradually conformed to the global trends in power sector reform that began in 
the 1980s. By 2006, all but a few of  the twenty-four countries of  sub-Saharan Africa covered by the World 
Bank’s Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic had enacted a power sector reform law, three-quarters had 
introduced some form of  private participation in power, two-thirds had corporatized their state-owned 
power utilities, two-thirds had established some kind of  regulatory oversight body, and more than a third 
had IPPs in operation.195 However, reform remains partial and incomplete; rarely in sub-Saharan Africa does 
one encounter the standard reform model, that is, unbundling, privatization, and wholesale and retail com-
petition.196 Although some reform steps have been taken, there have incredulously been few improvements 
to utilities.197 Furthermore, the private sector has also had only limited involvement in reforms thus far.198
The incompleteness of  power sector reform has been characterized by low levels of  administrative ca-
pacity of  energy regulatory agencies. Independent electricity or energy regulatory agencies have also been 
established in most sub-Saharan African countries; however, they are now criticized for inconsistent deci-
sion-making and for exacerbating regulatory risk. Although these regulatory agencies are de jure independent 
in their decision-making, regulators are far from independent in a de facto sense. Regulators are often subject 
189  See generally Patrick Chabal & Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument (1999); Jean-François Bayart, 
The State in Africa: Politics of  the Belly (1989).
190  See Ernest Harsch, Accumulators and Democrats: Challenging State Corruption in Africa, 31 J. Modern Afr. Stud. 31, 34 (1993).
191  See generally Robert H. Jackson & Carl Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa (1982); Robert H. Jackson & Carl Rosberg, 
Personal Rule: Theory and Practice in Africa, 16 Comp. Pol., no. 4, 1984; Chabal & Daloz, supra note 189.
192  Robert H. Jackson & Carl Rosberg, Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood, 35 World Pol. 1, 
1 (1982).
193  See Udombana, supra note 157, at, 1215 (2003).
194  See generally Jackson & Rosberg, supra note 192; Jeffrey Herbst & Greg Mills, There is No Congo, Foreign Policy (Mar. 18, 2009). 
Available in: <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/03/17/there_is_no_congo>.
195  Eberhard et al., supra note 10, at vi, 15; eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 80.
196  See Eberhard et al., supra note 10, at vi, 15; eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 180-81; J.E. Besant-Jones, Reforming Power Markets 
in Developing Countries: What Have We Learned 22 (Energy & Mining Sector Board Discussion Paper No. 19, 2006). Uganda is one of  
the exceptions where generation, transmission, and distribution were fully unbundled. In Kenya, generation (KenGen) has been 
separated from transmission and distribution (KPLC). Ghana has unbundled its transmission company and has a separate distribu-
tion company. Nigeria has technically unbundled its utility, although the separate entities still coordinate with each other. For histori-
cal reasons, local governments in Namibia and South Africa assume some responsibility for distribution.
197 See Eberhard et al., supra note 10, at 14-15. This is a confusing result because power sector reform is expected to improve 
performance. 
198  See eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 79.
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to pressure from governments to modify or overturn decisions.199 Turnover among commissioners has been 
high, with many resigning under pressure before completing their full term.200 This is particularly proble-
matic for Power Africa because regulators are responsible for establishing the technical, commercial, and 
procedural framework in which IPPs operate.201 Accordingly, their political independence is cardinal to the 
commercial viability of  power generation and rural electrification.202 Low levels of  absolute capacity among 
electricity regulatory agencies have produced a particular institutional structure that threatens the long-term 
commercial viability of  IPPs and deters rural Africans from gaining access to electricity.
Instead of  the standard market reform of  the power sector, sub-Saharan Africa has seen the emergence 
of  hybrid markets in which incumbent state-owned utilities often retain dominant market positions.203 Private 
sector cooperation is either temporary—for example, a limited-term management contract—or marginal, in the 
form of  IPPs that contract with the state-owned national utility.204 These vertically-integrated parastatal205 elec-
trical utilities have been observed as highly inefficient.206 Thus, like many of  the region’s state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), the electrical utility is a “white elephant.” These centralized hybrid power markets have generally been 
characterized as having low technical capacity, evidenced by poor performance on both technical and commer-
cial fronts. Average distribution losses in Africa are 23% compared with the commonly-used norm of  10% or 
less in developed countries.207 Moreover, average collection rates are only 88.4% compared with best practice of  
100%.208 The inefficiency of  the median utility is equivalent to 50% of  turnover, which means that only two-
-thirds of  revenue is captured.209 There are two main implications for the inefficiency of  state-owned electrical 
utilities in hybrid markets. First, because utility managers are forced to forgo maintenance to cover operating 
deficits, future utility performance is constrained; countries with below-average efficiency have increased electri-
fication rates by only 0.8% each year compared with 1.4% for utilities with above-average efficiency.210 Second, 
inefficiency-caused operating deficits render many national utilities commercially insolvent.211
Despite low technical capacity and significant commercial performance, the hybrid power market per-
sists along with an underperforming national electrical utility. The literature identifies two main reasons for 
the persistence of  these white elephants. On an ideological front, Fabrikant traces the origin of  public en-
terprises in developing countries to colonialism, pointing out that many former European colonial powers 
utilized corporations as an arm of  their governments for seizing foreign territories.212 Upon independence, 
many developing nations opted for a strategy of  economic development based on state ownership and 
control of  much of  the industrial sector, which they hoped would bring about structural changes in their 
economies.213 Parastatal organizations have a long and storied history in African economics, beginning in the 
pre-independence colonial period, and crystallizing under various nationalization schemes of  Afro-Marxist 
regimes. As an expression of  socialist/Marxist ideology, public enterprises were a manifestation of  national 
sovereignty and a means to establishing greater equity within society. 
199  Id. at 95; Eberhard et al., supra note 10, at 47-48.
200  eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 95; Eberhard et al., supra note 10, at 47-48.
201  See supra notes 168-74.
202  See Haanyika, supra note 26, at 2980, 2989.
203  eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 79; Eberhard et al., supra note 10, at vi, 15; Anton Eberhard & Katharine Nawaal Gratwick, 
IPPs in Sub-Saharan Africa, 39 energy pol’y 5541, 5542 (2011).
204  Eberhard et al., supra note 10, at vi, 5.
205  A parastatal organization is defined as having some political authority and serving the state indirectly.
206  See eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 133; Gisela Prasad, supra note 31, at 249; John Turkson & Norbert Wohlgemuth, Power 
Sector Reform and Distributed Generation in sub-Saharan Africa, 29 energy pol’y 135, 137 (2001).
207  eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 134.
208  Id.
209  Id. 
210  Id.
211  See id.; TenenBaum eT al., supra note 60, at 48, 169, 199 .
212  Robert Fabrikant, Developing Country State Enterprises: Performance and Control, 15 colum. J. TransnaT’l l. 40, 40-56 
(1976).
213  See BerTil walsTedT, sTaTe manufacTuring enTerprises in a mixed economy: The TurKish case 3-55 (1980).
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The second reason, which is grounded in political economic logic, is consistent with the causal mecha-
nism of  state incapacity and the argument of  this paper. SOEs were a means to establishing and crystallizing 
systems of  clientelistic reciprocity through political patronage.214 SOEs constitute a sizeable amount of  
national employment and managerial positions within public enterprises that are lucrative and highly desi-
red; accordingly, these positions are a strong form of  political capital. Thus, privatization may be resisted to 
retain the political capital employed by the state apparatus in order to maintain political power and regime 
stability. In its more nefarious incarnation, the endurance of  SOEs operates as “the politics of  nonreform” 
in order to perpetuate patrimonial politics, maintain systems of  clientelistic reciprocity, and continue klep-
tocratic practices.215 In the case of  the hybrid power market and Power Africa, low levels of  absolute state 
capacity—particularly regulatory and administrative capacities—cause the reform of  the power sector to 
be functionally incomplete in order to retain important political capital. While independent regulatory insti-
tutions for the power sector may exist in a de jure sense, in practice, these institutions are highly politicized, 
technically incapacitated, and commercially unsuccessful. In a de facto sense, the state retains full control 
of  the regulatory decisions that determine the profitability and logistics surrounding rural electrification. 
However, because these institutions lack political independence, they cease to operate in a technocratic and 
socially-ameliorative manner, and, instead, promulgate policies guided by a narrow, particularistic logic. 
The hybrid power market presents several challenges to the implementation of  Power Africa by threa-
tening the long-term commercial sustainability of  IPPs.216 The first main challenge stems from the internal 
contradictions of  the hybrid power market and a poor understanding of  it. Following power sector reform 
and the creation of  the hybrid power market, the responsibilities for planning and procurement of  new 
power infrastructure were often moved to the ministry of  energy or electricity.217 Due to poor communi-
cation and technical disparities between state institutions, plans are often poorly executed, and generation 
expansion planning has collapsed.218 Where still present, planning tends to take the form of  outdated, rigid 
master plans that do not reflect the changes in price and availability of  fuel and equipment and the resulting 
least-cost options.219
Similarly, poor understanding of  the hybrid power market prevents policymakers from devising clear 
and transparent criteria for allocating new building opportunities among the state utility and IPPs.220 For 
instance, when the government begins procurements, they may not conduct internationally competitive bi-
dding; this is a problem because a rigorous bidding process provides credibility and transparency and results 
in more competitively priced power.221 Tanzania epitomizes this problem.222 It was expected that the Songo 
Songo project, a sixty MW gas-to-electricity plant project would be up and running within less than a year, 
despite the significant infrastructure development and financing required. In 1995, despite work on Songo 
Songo remaining outstanding, a second deal was struck by the Tanzanian government for 100 MW of  diesel 
engines, known as Independent Power Tanzania Limited (IPTL), under a twenty-year PPA. At the time, 
214  See generally Nicolas van de Walle, Privatization in Developing Countries: A Review of  the Issues, 17 World Dev., no. 5, 
1989.
215  See Nicolas van de Walle, The Politics of  Nonreform in Cameroon, in hemmed in: responses To africa’s economic de-
cline 357-97 (Thomas M. Callaghy & John Ravenhill, eds. 1993); see generally Chabal & Daloz, supra note 189.
216  See eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 79 (noting that IPPs are introduced on the margin of  the sector in in the hybrid power 
market).
217  Id. at 89.
218  Id.
219  Id. 
220  Relatedly, “[w]hat has emerged as a general trend is that the mere presence of  a regulator is not in and of  itself  a defining 
factor in attracting IPPs. An independent regulator may have positive, negative or no impact on outcomes. If, however, regulatory 
governance is transparent, fair and accountable, and if  regulatory decisions are credible and predictable, there is greater potential for 
positive outcomes for host country and investor alike.”  Eberhard & Gratwick, supra note 203, at 5543.
221  eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 91.
222  See Katharine Gratwick et al., Generating Power and Controversy: Understanding Tanzania’s Independent Power Projects 22-31 (Mgmt. 
Program in Infrastructure Reform & Reg., Working Paper, 2007); eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 91; Gratwick & Eberhard, supra 
note 42, at 35-36.
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Tanzania could absorb power from one plant, but certainly not two. Gratwick and Eberhard note the impe-
tus for IPTL may be attributed to a host of  factors, including alleged corruption.223 In the aftermath of  the 
IPTL deal was a lengthy attempt at cancellation and renegotiation of  this second plant, as well as temporary 
postponement of  Songo Songo led by the World Bank.224 Accordingly, due to a lack of  understanding of  
the hybrid power market, Tanzania had no IPPs in operation rather than two. 
A second set of  challenges associated with the hybrid power market focus on the off-take arrangement 
between the IPP and national utility. As previously noted, national utilities are characterized by low levels 
of  technical capacity and significant inefficiencies that have rendered many commercially insolvent.225 This 
commercial insolvency poses considerable risks to IPPs that contract to sell their power to national utilities 
in order to secure a guaranteed revenue stream. Without this assured revenue, the commercial sustainability 
of  IPPs is considerably threatened. As Paul Hinks noted,
[a]nother serious challenge to the success of  power investments in Africa is the creditworthiness, or 
lack thereof, of  the “off-takers” which are usually the government-owned utilities that purchase the 
electricity from the power producers and distribute it to the consumers. In most instances, the state-
owned utility cannot demonstrate a sufficient level of  assurance that it will be in a position to pay the 
private-sector producers or that it will pay promptly and in accordance with the terms of  the contract. 
In practice, if  the producers are not paid, they will in turn default on their payments to banks and other 
financial institutions that help fund the investments that have very little tolerance for non-payment.226
Hybrid markets require clarity on the IPP off-take arrangements incumbent national utilities that aggre-
gate demand and average prices for customers. Surprisingly few African countries have explicitly defined 
their power market structures or procedures for negotiating and contracting PPAs with IPPs.227 Some coun-
tries have used the single-buyer model with the national utility as the buyer; however, it is unclear whether 
exclusivity is part of  this monopsonistic relationship. Accordingly, both the inherent credit risk associated 
with the national utility of  the off-taker and the lack of  clarity with respect to the IPP’s potential customers 
have significant effects on the commercial sustainability of  power projects in sub-Saharan Africa. The next 
section approaches the institutional design of  power sectors in sub-Saharan Africa from a different perspec-
tive, focusing on the intergovernmental dynamics that arise due to low levels of  independence both within 
the state apparatus and between state and society.
5. whEn thE cEntEr holds: IntErgovErnmEntAl rElAtIons of thE powEr sEctor
Due to low absolute and relative state capacity, the endurance of  the centralized neopatrimonial state 
and the centralization of  the power sector also have important implications for the implementation of  
Power Africa due to intergovernmental relations. Power Africa’s goal of  extending access to electricity in 
sub-Saharan Africa, combined with the significant urban-rural disparity in access to electricity, suggests a 
critical role for subnational governments and DG in Power Africa. These intergovernmental relations can 
be understood as the sets of  political, administrative, and fiscal relationships between the autonomous levels 
of  government in a single country.228 Weingast, Montinola, and Qian contend that decentralized control 
over the economy by subnational governments within a common market prevents the central government 
from interfering with markets.229 Additionally, intergovernmental competition over mobile sources of  re-
223  Gratwick & Eberhard, supra note 42, at 35.
224  Id. at 35-36; eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 91.
225  See supra note 211.
226  Hinks Testimony, supra note 15.
227  See eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 92.
228  See J. Tyler Dickovick, Decentralization and Recentralization in the Developing World: Comparative Studies from Africa and 
Latin America and Africa 3 (2011).
229  Gabriella Montinola et al., Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China, 48 World Pol. 50, 58 (1995). 
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venue also constrains individual subnational governments.230 Relatedly, locating decision-making as close to 
the ground as possible enables a better understanding of  the interplay of  cultural, institutional, and political 
factors involved, and will lead to better decisions.231 When there is a great deal of  economic, environmental, 
or linguistic heterogeneity in the nature of  tax bases or taxpayers, as there is in sub-Saharan Africa, decen-
tralization will be more efficient because it allows an administration to be tailored to local conditions.232 By 
comparison, advocates for a more centralized approach note that “[a] well-known problem with the decen-
tralization of  standard-setting power to local governments is that local authorities are often particularly vul-
nerable to lobbying by industrial interest groups as a consequence of  the controlling role that such groups 
often play in the socio-economic interests of  local communities.”233 
In the context of  Power Africa and the extension of  access to electricity, the centralization of  formal 
political institutions and the electrical power infrastructure has two main implications. First, centralization 
reinforces and further crystallizes the urban bias problem; with the locus of  politics and economic policy 
continuing to be based in the national capital, rural populations will continue to face high collective actions 
costs and have little capacity to advance their interests. Accordingly, centralization represents the catalyst of  
a vicious cycle of  urban bias and anti-rural policies, including, but not limited to, the power sector. Second, 
institutional centralization represents a significant deterrent to the development of  DG projects in rural 
areas. Countries with dedicated rural electrification agencies (REAs) or rural electrification funds (REFs) 
have achieved higher rates of  electrification than those that have not.234 For instance, the percentage of  rural 
connection is twice as high in countries with both REAs and REFs than countries with neither institution.235 
Several different mechanisms contribute to the importance of  decentralization and higher levels of  subnational 
political and fiscal autonomy to rural electrification. First, the likelihood of  poor performance of  DG projects is re-
duced when project planners select technologies that match the social characteristics of  the community.236 Meeting 
end users’ needs, which vary both across and within communities, also affects the end users’ willingness to pay that 
has clear implications for the financial sustainability of  the DG project.237 For instance, case study evidence suggests 
that relatively poor individuals and communities tend to prefer that programs install mini-grids or community-level 
programs, whereas wealthier individuals tend to implement single-family solar home systems.238 Decentralization is 
typically most effective and efficient at providing information on the local context and the needs, tastes, and pre-
ferences of  the local end users;239 accordingly, a centralized power infrastructure fails to provide the specificity and 
context necessary to promote successful DG programs in rural areas.
This argument is more generally known as “market-preserving federalism.”  See Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of  Political 
Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. Econ. & Org. 1, 3 (1995). But see generally Jonathan Rodden & 
Susan Rose-Ackerman, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1521 (1997) (critiquing market-preserving federalism).
230  Montinola et al., supra note 229, at 58.
231  Joseph Stiglitz, Senior Vice President & Chief  Economist, The World Bank, Keynote Address at the World Bank Annual 
Conference on Development Economics: Whither Reform? Ten Years of  the Transition (Apr. 28, 1999), http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTABCDEWASHINGTON1999/Resources/stiglitz.pdf.
232  Paul Smoke, Local Government Finance in Developing Countries: The Case of  Kenya 36 (1994).
233  Michael Faure et al., Bucking the Kuznets Curve: Designing Effective Environmental Regulation in Developing Countries, 51 Va. J. Int’l L. 
95, 120 (2010); see also Rodden & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 229, at 1532-35.
234  Eberhard et al., supra note 10, at 49; Eberhard et al., supra note 4, at 105, 107-8.
235  Eberhard et al., supra note 4, at 108.
236  See Brass et al., supra note 64, at 120, 131; Eberhard et al., supra note 4, at 120 (emphasizing the importance of  community 
involvement in extending access to electricity).
237  Brass et al., supra note 64, at 123.
238  See generally Claus, supra note 78; S. Komatsu et al., Are Micro-benefits Negligible? The Implications of  the Rapid Expansion of  Solar 
Home Systems (SHS) in Rural Bangladesh for Sustainable Development, 39 energy pol’y 4022 (2011).
239  See supra notes 230-32.
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Secondly, the principle of  collaborative governance240 and the ongoing involvement of  end users are es-
sential to the success of  DG projects.241 Empirical research on collaborative governance suggests that parti-
cipation of  end users improves service provision outcomes, such as risk reduction.242 Ultimately, “[a] decen-
tralized approach that mobilizes consultation with all stakeholders will ensure that needs and expectations 
are expressed and the most suitable energy solutions are explored.”243 In doing so, an enabling environment 
for the involvement of  multiple stakeholders, including provincial governments and local communities, will 
be created that will facilitate the development of  energy projects and the extension of  electricity to rural 
areas. The next section takes up how IPPs and rural consumers are marginalized by these centralized power 
institutions through a systematically biased regulatory framework.
6. rEgulAtors, mount up! powEr rEgulAtIon And rurAl mArgInAlIzAtIon
A dearth of  absolute capacity, evidenced by the politicization of  the bureaucracy, and relative capacity, 
evidence by the presence of  urban bias, also creates a regulatory framework that represents a significant im-
plementation challenge of  Power Africa. Earl Gast, USAID’s Assistant Administrator for Africa, noted that 
the pace of  private sector investment has been hurt by an unfriendly regulatory environment.244 State elites, 
in order to harness political capital and ensure regime survival, create power regulations that concurrently 
affect the demand-side and supply-side elements of  rural electrification. Under Power Africa, IPPs and end 
users constitute the supply and demand elements, respectively. Specifically, low state capacity constrains the 
supply of  new power projects by not providing a tariff  structure that is commercially sustainable and poorly 
structuring PPAs. On the demand side, regulations make access to electricity cost-prohibitive for many po-
tential end users because of  improperly structured subsidies and high, poorly-structured connection rates.
Supply-side issues
Feed-in-tariffs
The feed-in-tariff  (FIT) typically receives most of  the spotlight in the world of  energy project deve-
lopment. A FIT is a tariff-support mechanism, typically for renewable energy generators or cogenerators, 
in which the generator is guaranteed a certain rate of  payment for the wholesale power that it sells to the 
national utility, the national system operator, or other obligated purchaser of  its power.245 In most instances, 
FITs for IPPs are set administratively rather than competitively as the outcome of  a structured bidding pro-
cess.246 In low-income countries, FITs have the largest effect on DG dissemination.247 Accordingly, absence 
of  a FIT is cited as a barrier to distributed models of  electrification.248 
240  See Brass et al., supra note 64, at 127 (defining collaborative governance as “a collective decision-making process whereby 
public-sector agencies engage and deliberate with a variety of  nonstate actors, including NGOs, private-sector firms, interest groups, 
community members, and individuals, to formulate, implement, manage, and regulate public policies, services, and programs”).
241  See id. at 120, 124-25, 127 (identifying the prominent themes of  collaborative governance and end-user involvement in the 
DG literature); IEA, supra note 125, at 9, 102 (identifying end-user involvement as a precondition to successful rural electrification).
242  See, e.g., Eberhard & Gratwick, supra note 203, at 5455.
243  Mohiuddin, supra note 104, at 123.
244  See Karambu, supra note 16 (quoting USAID’s Assistant Administrator for Africa Earl Gast: “One of  the obstacles we are 
facing is structuring a deal and attaining financial closure. It is difficult because it involves policy reforms that need implementing, 
or measures that have been agreed to by the government, but which are dragging.”).
245  See TenenBaum eT al., supra note 60, at 155, 179-80.
246  Id. at 179.
247  Brass et al., supra note 64, at 130.
248  See id. at 126; see generally A. Yadoo & H. Cruickshank, The Value of  Cooperatives in Rural Electrification, 38 energy pol’y 2941 
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There are two main methods for setting FITs in developing countries: (1) the avoided-cost method, which 
values the FIT based on an estimation of  costs that the utility or society will avoid by purchasing power 
generated from a renewable source; and (2) the standardized, cost-reflective, technology-specific method, which bases 
the FIT on the estimated cost of  generation for each designated renewable energy technology, assuming 
that the developer has made a least-cost investment and will operate in an efficient manner.249 The regulatory 
regime’s choice of  FIT has immediate effects on the commercial sustainability of  the IPP. If  an avoided-
-cost approach is used, all eligible renewable energy generators receive the same FIT that does not vary ba-
sed on the generation technology.250Accordingly, not all generation technologies will be equally viable under 
the avoided-cost approach. 
Thus, with a politicized bureaucratic structure with considerable pressures from urban elites, low levels 
of  state capacity marginalize IPPs that focus on technologies that would primarily thrive in rural areas. In 
countries with tariffs set at the purchasing utility’s avoided costs, it is usually the case that only a few projects 
will be commercially viable, usually larger-scale biomass cogeneration and particularly good small hydro-
power sites.251 Other important renewable energy technologies will not be commercially viable if  the FIT is 
set at the utility’s avoided costs. For example, wind power and solar power, which are generally prevalent in 
rural areas, will be nonviable because their costs will almost always be higher than the utility’s avoided-cost-
-based FIT.252 For instance, Tanzania utilizes an avoided-cost FIT.253 Based on 2012 tariff  rates, estimated 
fifteen-year cost estimates conclude only hydropower and biomass from agricultural residues will be com-
mercially sustainable, while wind and grown biomass—both resources plentiful in rural areas—will not be 
commercial sustainable.254
The principal responsibility of  the regulator is to optimally set these tariffs—high enough that they will, 
after a transition period of  several years, recover operating costs, capital depreciation, and debt payments, 
and provide for reserves to deal with emergency repairs and replacements—while concurrently protecting 
consumers from IPPs that try to exercise monopoly power after receiving a license or permit issued by 
the regulator.255 Three main tariff  principles are frequently encountered in sub-Saharan Africa: (1) uniform 
national tariffs, where all citizens in the same tariff  category pay the same tariff  for electricity regardless of  
where they live; (2) avoided-cost tariffs, where an IPP operator is allowed to set tariffs that produce monthly 
bills to consumers that are equal to or below what the consumers would have been paying on other energy 
purchases that are now replaced by electricity; and (3) cost-reflective tariffs, tariffs that produce enough reve-
nues to recover the overall capital and operating costs likely to be incurred by an actual or hypothetical IPP 
operator.256 If  cost-reflective tariffs are not allowed because the IPP operator’s tariffs are capped at a lower 
level—either by informal political pressures or formal legal requirements—there will be a financial gap that 
will render the IPP commercially unsustainable.257
However, due to a lack of  absolute and relative state capacity, the implementation of  cost-reflective tari-
ffs is actively resisted in lieu of  de jure or de facto uniform national tariffs. While many of  the newer national 
electricity laws in sub-Saharan Africa require the regulator to set cost-reflective tariffs rather than a uniform 
national tariff, the current reality is that most retail tariffs are both uniform and too low.258 In the most 
complete survey performed to date on the financial condition of  sub-Saharan African utilities, the Africa 
(2010).
249  TenenBaum eT al., supra note 60, at 180-81.
250  Id. at 183.
251  Id.
252  Id.
253  See id. at 190.
254  Id. at 184.
255  Id. at 240.
256  Id. 
257  See id. at 10, 240.
258  See id. at 242-43.
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Infrastructure Country Diagnostic concluded that only ten of  twenty-one national utilities in sub-Saharan 
Africa were allowed to charge tariffs that covered their operating costs, and only six of  twenty-one national 
utilities could charge tariffs that covered operating and capital costs.259 The underlying mechanism for such 
policy inertia is urban bias personified: 
[t]he reason countries often tolerate and, in some cases, actively resist movement to cost-reflective tariffs 
may be precisely because the status quo favors the relatively few, better off  consumers who are actually 
connected to the grid. These consumers are mostly urban dwellers with the power to mobilize against 
governments and manipulate policies for their own benefit.260 
One high-level African energy ministry official referred to immediate implementation of  an overall cost-
-recovering tariff  for the national utility as the equivalent of  political suicide, especially when the general 
public thinks that the national utility is inefficiently run and filled with corrupt employees.261 Consequently, 
uniform national tariffs are rarely allowed to rise to cost-reflective levels, even when legally required under 
the national energy law.
A uniform national tariff  ignores the fact that the real cost of  providing electricity in rural areas is almost 
always higher than providing the same electricity in urban areas due to higher capital cost and higher ope-
rating costs.262 Accordingly, under a uniform national tariff, IPPs that serve rural communities experience a 
gap between their costs and revenues. In some cases, the cost-revenue gap arises because a law or regulation 
prohibits IPPs from charging tariffs that are high enough to cover their costs.263 In other cases, IPPs cannot 
charge cost-recovering tariffs because the national utility operating on the centralized track has created a 
nationwide de facto price ceiling by charging its customers below-cost retail tariffs, thereby making it seem 
to potential customers that the electricity provided by the IPP is too expensive.264 As a longtime Tanzanian 
mini-hydro specialist observed: 
[i]t costs TANESCO [the Tanzania Electric Supply Company, the national utility] at least 500 shillings/
kWh [about $0.33] for operational cost alone, and add management and distribution costs, then power 
from TANESCO’s isolated mini-grids costs something like 800 [about $0.50] shillings. It is crazy that 
TANESCO turns around and sells it at 130 shillings [about $0.08]. No investor can possibly build 
projects with this situation. And the problem is that everyone now expects electricity at 130 shillings. If  
someone gets permission to charge a higher price than this, some villagers will go to the power plant 
and break equipment saying, “you make too much money.”265
Ultimately, the political economy that undergirds tariff  regulation in sub-Saharan Africa presents a signi-
ficant barrier to rural electrification and the implementation of  Power Africa. As long as uniform national 
tariffs are maintained—either by formal legal or informal political mechanisms—IPPs serving rural areas 
will face significant additional costs that will threaten the commercial sustainability of  their investments. 
Power purchase agreements
A PPA is the contract that enables an IPP to connect with and sell electricity to a utility-owned grid.266 
PPAs are critical to the commercial viability of  a power project for several reasons. First, PPAs remove a 
considerable amount of  risk and ensure a revenue flow for the IPP by contracting for purchasing electricity 
259  Eberhard et al., supra note 10, at 29.
260  Eberhard & Shkaratan,  supra note 2, at 13; see also TenenBaum eT al., supra note 60, at 243 (“The stated or unstated rationale 
for a uniform national tariff  is that electricity is seen as a basic right to which all citizens are entitled. For most elected officials, who have 
their eyes on the next election, fairness is much more important than cost recovery.”).
261  TenenBaum eT al., supra note 60, at 244.
262  See id. at 243-44.
263  Id. at 11.
264  Id. 
265  Id. at 244.
266 See id. at 6.
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generated by the project. Projected revenues, in turn, comprise the single most important criterion that will 
render a power generation project bankable and ultimately capable of  being on-sold to other investors.
Second, in many developing countries, including sub-Saharan Africa, the state-owned power utility is 
usually the IPP’s only customer and main source of  revenue. PPAs also set forth important terms of  the 
transaction between the IPP and the government, including the tariff, the term, and how various risks, such 
as force majeure, are mitigated and allocated. Ultimately, the PPA is the foundation of  a power project’s banka-
bility. As a first order issue, PPAs need to actually exist. Although many of  the medium-to-large sized power 
projects in Africa have had a long-term PPA to ensure a market for the power produced and to secure reve-
nue flows for debt and equity providers,267 not all countries use PPAs. PPAs require a level of  technical and 
legal expertise in order to be successfully executed. In light of  the relatively low levels of  technical capacity 
in many African bureaucracies, the utilization of  PPAs may be deterred for institutional reasons. However, 
technical assistance can be supplied by external actors. For instance, the Power Africa team at USAID has 
prided itself  on helping the Government of  Ethiopia and a project developer execute the first-ever PPA in 
the country’s history.268 
If  PPAs do exist, issues of  absolute capacity—particularly low administrative and technical capacities—
can negatively affect the commercial viability of  IPPs through the structure of  the PPA. First, the absence 
of  “deemed energy” clauses represents a substantial commercial threat to the commercial viability of  IPPs, 
particularly to small power producers without capacity payments.269 Deemed energy refers to a situation in 
which a main-grid-connected IPP seller is able to produce electricity, but the buyer is unable to receive it. 
Accordingly, a deemed energy clause in the PPA obligates the buyer to provide compensation for electricity 
that the IPP was capable of  producing but the buyer was unable to receive.270 The three most common rea-
sons that prevent a utility from receiving an IPP’s energy are (1) insufficient overall generation capacity; (2) 
insufficient capacity or damage to the local distribution network; and (3) weakness on the receiving utility’s 
transmission grids.271 Importantly, each of  those reasons can be traced back to poor institutionalization of  
the power sector, including significant technical and commercial inefficiencies.272 Additionally, because na-
tional utilities implement uniform national tariff  rates that are too low to cover costs in order to secure po-
litical support from urban constituents,273 they are forced to forego maintenance in order to cover operating 
deficits.274As inefficiencies persist and operation deficits increase over time, the frequency of  the national 
utility being unable to receive energy and engaging in rolling blackouts should increase over time. Once a 
disturbance or lack of  capacity in the national utility’s system occurs, IPPs must shut down in the absence 
of  a deemed energy clause, as they do not have a guaranteed revenue stream as long as the national utility 
is unable to receive energy. 
Even if  PPAs with deemed energy clauses are included in power transactions, there is still uncertainty 
about the reliability of  the off-taker. It has already been noted that, unlike most utilities in developed coun-
tries and many developing countries, almost all state-owned utilities in sub-Saharan Africa are, at present, 
commercially insolvent due to systemic inefficiencies caused by a confluence of  low technical capacity and 
the promulgation of  suboptimal pricing mechanisms motivated by a lack of  relative autonomy from societal 
267  Gratwick & Eberhard, supra note 42, at 43.
268  Hinks Testimony, supra note 15; u.s. agency for inT’l dev., What Power Africa Means for Ethiopia. Available in: <http://www.
usaid.gov/powerafrica/partners/african-governments/ethiopia>. (last visited July 25, 2014).
269  A capacity payment is a payment made to an IPP that ensures it can recover costs and earn a profit even if  its power is not 
dispatched. See, e.g., TenenBaum eT al., supra note 60, at 161.
270  Id. at 162.
271  Id. at 162-63.
272  See supra notes 206-11.
273  See TenenBaum eT al., supra note 60, at 244 (“The current reality for most national utilities in Sub-Saharan Africa is that tariffs 
are both uniform and too low.”).
274  See supra note 259.
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interests.275 As the national utility often operates as a monopsony for IPPs, the prevailing insolvency raises 
significant issues with respect to the creditworthiness of  the utility as the off-taker under the PPA. Key 
actors in Power Africa, including Symbion Power, the International Finance Corporation (the finance-arm 
of  the World Bank), and USAID have all expressed concern with respect to the reliability and creditwor-
thiness of  the off-taker as a key challenge of  Power Africa.276 In Tanzania in June 2012, several potential 
small power project developers complained to the national electricity regulator at a public meeting that the 
current PPA for grid-connected small power projects (SPPs) was not bankable on a project finance basis by 
the standards of  non-Tanzanian financial institutions.277 Among the weaknesses that they pointed to in the 
current PPA were: (1) currency risk, since the payments would be in Tanzanian shillings, but debt payments 
would be in hard currencies such as dollars or euros; (2) a lack of  indexing for the FIT price floor; and (3) no 
required payments if  the buying utility was unable to receive energy from the SPP because of  problems on 
the buyer’s transmission grid.278 Ultimately, until IPPs are able to externalize their risk or African institutions 
establish a more bankable PPA, implementing Power Africa’s goals will be challenging.
Demand-side issues
Subsidy structures
Even if  a commercially sustainable and attractive investment climate and regulatory framework for IPPs 
is fostered by African governments, access to electricity must not be cost prohibitive for consumers if  Power 
Africa is to be successfully implemented. Consumer or demand-side subsidies are one such mechanism in 
order to make electricity more affordable and therefore more accessible to those currently without access. In 
most African countries, tariffs for power are heavily subsidized. On average, power tariffs recover only 87% 
of  full costs.279 Service subsidies amount to as much as $3.6 billion per year, or .56% of  Africa’s GDP.280 
These subsidies contribute to the precarious financial state of  national utilities.281 However, empirical evi-
dence suggests that these subsidies largely bypass low-income households not even connected to services; 
accordingly, subsidies benefit the nonpoor. The share of  subsidies going to the poor is less than half  their 
share in the population, indicating a very pro-rich distribution.282 Accordingly, while the usual justification 
for subsidies is to make services affordable to low-income households, power subsidies are ironically and 
perversely structured to exclude low-income households from accessing electricity.
At the heart of  this perverse logic is the politicization of  subsidies through the causal mechanism of  
urban bias. The social and economic groups that are bypassed by subsidies—low-income households and 
those not connected to power services—map neatly onto rural populations. Additionally, heavy subsidies to 
urban consumption of  electricity resonate strongly with urban bias theory. Because urban consumers place 
a significantly high value on their purchasing power, they are likely to pressure the government to provide 
heavy subsidies to power services in order to retain relatively strong purchasing power.283 Due to limited 
revenue284 and the generally high macroeconomic cost of  subsidies,285 it is unlikely that extending these 
275  See supra notes 206-11.
276  See supra note 15.
277  TeneBaum eT al., supra note 60, at 159.
278  Id.
279  eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 115.
280  Id.
281  See supra note 211.
282  See eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 117 (providing statistics of  the distributional incidence of  subsidies received by the 
poor).
283  See supra note 185. 
284  See supra notes 175-79.
285  See eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 118.
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subsidies is economically viable. Accordingly, following the script of  urban bias, rural areas are squeezed in 
order to benefit the more politically-active urban sector that are greater threats to the survival of  the regime. 
A natural solution to overcome this disparity is to implement cross-subsidies, tariff  structures where 
some customers pay more for their costs of  supply and other customers pay less than their costs of  sup-
ply.286 Effectively, one group of  consumers subsidizes another group by paying different amounts. In the 
developing world, the three most common forms of  cross-subsidies are divided along industrial/residential, 
high-usage/low-usage, and urban/rural lines.287 Despite the widespread approval of  cross-subsidies as a 
policy instrument to further pro-poor, pro-rural electrification,288 state executives typically support uniform 
national tariffs, which, by definition, preclude cross-subsidization.289 Cross-subsidies are generally discou-
raged in policy statements and often statutorily prohibited.290 For example, Tanzania’s 2008 Electricity Law 
states that “no customer class should pay more than a licensee than is justified by the costs that it imposes 
on such a licensee.”291 Although the adoption of  cross-subsidies would be beneficial for rural electrification 
goals, it would come with significant political consequences. Urban consumers’ de facto subsidization of  rural 
consumers constitutes an erosion of  urban purchasing power, which would not only be politically unpo-
pular, but also illegal in some countries. Implementing cross-subsidies could open African governments to 
removal via election or other modes of  unrest such as protects, strikes, or riots. Accordingly, low state capa-
city and the presence of  urban bias present a significant deterrent to the legal adoption of  cross-subsidies 
that would contribute to the goals of  Power Africa.
Connection charges
Even if  a government has created an investment and regulatory climate that allows for IPPs to be com-
mercially sustainable and even has a subsidy structure in place that extends into low-income, rural areas, 
the lights may still not turn on. Connection charges, “the fee[s] charged to a customer to connect to an 
established distribution network”,292 remain the single biggest impediment to expanding electrification in 
sub-Saharan Africa.293 Simply put, “to the unconnected, cheap power is as inaccessible as costly power.”294 
Connection rates are less than 30% in Africa, compared to 65% in South Asia and 85% in Asia and the Mi-
ddle East.295 Furthermore, many of  those who remain without a connection live reasonably close to existing 
networks.296 Even when distribution lines are provided to increase access, the percentage of  consumers who 
are able to connect to the network remains extremely low.297 The initial rates of  connections in villages newly 
added to the electrical grid are as low as 10-20% of  possible connections, and that number only increases 
only very slowly over time.298
Both the magnitude and structure of  the connection charges are identified as characteristics that deter 
consumer access to electricity. In sub-Saharan Africa, connection charge prices incredulously often exceed 
286  See TenenBaum eT al., supra note 60, at 137.
287  Id. 
288  See Tully, supra note 88, at 33; TenenBaum eT al., supra note 60, at 11, 49, 139-41, 258; eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 103.
289  See TenenBaum eT al., supra note 60, at 139; supra notes 256-65.
290  See TenenBaum eT al., supra note 60, at 137. But see id. at 137-48 (noting that statements and laws are sometimes ignored in 
practice).
291  Electricity Act of  2008, § 23(2)(f) (2008) (Tanz). But see id. § 23(2)(b) (noting that “tariffs should allow licensees to recover a 
fair return on their investment”).
292  Golumbeanu & Barnes, supra note 27, at 3.
293  TenenBaum eT al., supra note 60, at 122; see also IEA , supra note 125, at 9, 101; Eberhard & Shkaratan, supra note 2, at 14.
294  Eberhard et al., supra note 10, at ix; see also IEA, supra note 125, at 101.
295  eBerhard eT al., supra note 4, at 104.
296  Id. 
297  Golumbeanu & Barnes, supra note 27, at 2.
298  Id.
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a country’s annual per capita income.299 Sub-Saharan Africa also has the highest number of  connection 
charges in excess of  $100 per customer of  any region in the world.300 For instance, in Tanzania, TANESCO, 
the national utility, sets connection charges to new customers based on distance from existing distribution 
lines: $297 (thirty meters, $871 (thirty-one to seventy-one meters), and $1,288 (greater than seventy-one 
meters).301 With a per capita gross national income of  $1,560,302 this alone represents a significant constraint 
on access to electricity. Additionally, connection charges are typically structured as one-time, upfront fees.303 
Given the magnitude of  the charges, they can constitute a powerful disincentive to people who wish to ob-
tain electricity, no matter how much they desire the service.
Several straightforward and feasible policy instruments have been suggested in order to make connection 
charges more manageable, such as capital subsidies or amortization schemes where the connection cost is 
rolled into the tariff  or a long-term credit plan.304 However, few of  these policies have been implemented in 
sub-Saharan Africa.305 This policy inertia is grounded in a political economic logic motivated by the incapa-
city of  the state apparatus. Recall that this paper argues tariffs are set suboptimally low in sub-Saharan Africa 
in order to placate urban populations by effectively propping up their purchasing power through low electri-
city prices.306 Due to higher capital costs, higher operational costs, and lower economies of  scale, providing 
power to rural areas is more costly than supplying it in urban areas. Accordingly, utilities may fall far short 
of  recovering the expected operating costs in rural areas, particularly if  connection charges are high and 
load factors are relatively low.307 If  a utility doubts the government will make up the revenue shortfall, it will 
have an economic incentive to resist expanding service into rural areas.308 Accordingly, the high connection 
charge is an indirect way of  discouraging new users from signing up, conceptualized as a form of  “passive 
resistance” among state-owned utilities.309 Explaining the failure of  an electrification program in an African 
country, a donor memo lamented:
[name of  utility] did not make an effort to roll out connections to poor households under this scheme 
as it had no incentives to connect them, since the actual connection costs were three times higher, and 
clearly these costs would not be recouped through the lower tariff  revenue earned by serving low-
income household.310
Thus, connection costs epitomize the negative synergistic effect of  low state capacity on demand-side 
barriers to rural electrification and the implementation of  Power Africa. Pressures from both urban popula-
tions and the politicized institutions of  the state create a regulatory framework characterized by suboptimal 
tariffs and subsidies that places considerable revenue strain and insolvency on national utilities. As a result 
of  these structural factors, improper incentives exist for national utilities to extend access to electricity into 
rural areas. However, “getting prices right” would entail the imposition of  additional costs on urban popula-
tions that come with potentially dire political consequences. Accordingly, connection costs remain high and 
constitute a significant barrier to the approach and goals of  Power Africa.
299  Id. at 6.
300  Id.
301  Id. at 7.
302  The world BanK, GNI per capita PPP (current international $), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.
PP.CD (last visited July 25, 2014).
303  Golumbeanu & Barnes, supra note 27, at 2, 4-5.
304  Cook, supra note 56, at 311; Golumbeanu & Barnes, supra note 27, at 7, 17, 19; TenenBaum eT al., supra note 60, at 129.
305  But see, e.g., TenenBaum eT al., supra note 60, at 131, 136 (discussing Mali’s subsidy policy and Ethiopia’s connection-fee-
financing program).
306  See supra note 185.
307  Golumbeanu & Barnes, supra note 27, at 2.
308  Id.; TenenBaum eT al., supra note 60, at 22, 126-27.
309  TenenBaum eT al., supra note 60, at 127.
310  Id. at 128.
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7. conclusIon: unchAInIng shAngo
Power Africa represents an auspicious and innovative initiative to address sub-Saharan Africa’s extant 
power crisis that had significant implications for social, economic, and environmental development as well 
as the fulfillment of  an implicit attribute of  a number of  human rights. Characterized by a focus on private 
sector investment and collaboration between United States governmental agencies, private sector investors 
and developers, and African governments, Power Africa truly is a new paradigm that has learned from 
the historical lack of  success of  traditional, top-down aid paradigms and structural adjustment programs. 
However, Power Africa faces a number of  challenges in order to successfully achieve its goals by creating 
an attractive and favorable investment climate for long-term private sector investment and commercial 
sustainability, and providing the proper incentives for those currently lacking access to electricity—typically 
low-income, rural Africans—to be able to be involved with DG projects and afford access to the central 
grid. Thus far, the literature has devoted little attention to the challenges facing Power Africa, and the legal 
literature in particularly has not addressed power sector reform in sub-Saharan Africa.
Although the pervasive economic discourse of  “getting prices right” and establishing a strong legal and 
regulatory framework are essential to the success of  Power Africa, this paper has argued that there is an 
underlying political economic logic that causally explains two distinct yet related challenges of  implementing 
Power Africa. Specifically, the lack of  state capacity—evidenced by the politicization of  the state bureaucra-
cy and the presence of  urban bias—have created institutional structures and a regulatory framework that 
threaten both the commercial sustainability of  private sector power investment and the affordability of  ac-
cess to electricity by new users. State incapacity has produced an incompletely reformed hybrid power sector 
that is dominated by a vertically-integrated state monopoly and characterized by a centralized structure, in-
solvent national utilities, and politicized regulators. Lacking autonomy from urban populations, the African 
states have constructed a regulatory framework that constrains both the supply and demand elements of  
power access. IPPs are constrained by (1) suboptimal uniform tariff  structures that render development of  
power projects in rural areas commercially unsustainable; (2) PPAs that lack needed clauses that ensure a re-
venue stream for producers while the national utility cannot receive power; and (3) the general creditworthi-
ness and reliability of  the off-taker. Potential new users of  electricity are constrained by subsidy structures 
that bypass low-income, rural households in favor of  urban households and expensive, poorly-structured 
connection charges to the grid.  
The implications for future research stemming from this paper are considerable. At the time of  this pa-
per, Power Africa is nearing its second anniversary. Evaluating this paper’s argument against actual evidence 
of  Power Africa programs is the clearest step forward in this research program. Additionally, extending 
the theoretical framework of  this paper to other developing power markets, such as Latin America and 
Southeast Asia that have an increased interest in renewable energy, would provide empirical robustness 
and a strong comparative element to the analysis. Lastly, given the significant differences in the investment 
model311 and the increasing financial activity of  Chinese investment in the developing world, a broader 
comparative analysis of  Power Africa should be undertaken against China’s model of  foreign assistance and 
international investment.
As Power Africa moves forward, United States governmental agencies, in addition to supplying African 
governments with technical assistance and credit enhancement and risk mitigation instruments to investors, 
must understand the effect that institutional structures and dynamics have on the public-private partner-
ship power transactions that are at the core of  Power Africa. Accordingly, this paper suggests a number 
of  institutional and regulatory reforms to complement Power Africa’s existing technical assistance. On the 
institutional front, it is clear that establishing stronger bureaucratic independence from politicized and parti-
311  See, e.g., Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of  China in Africa (2009).
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cularistic elements of  the state apparatus and the state’s independence from urban populations are essential 
for strengthening both absolute and relative state capacities. First, the erosion of  urban bias results from 
the creation of  institutional mechanisms that establish stronger links of  accountability between state and 
rural populations. Simply put, a rationally-acting regime would quickly rethink policies systematically biased 
against rural areas if  these populations constituted a threat to the survival of  the regime. The establishment 
and further strengthening of  robust democratic institutions, particularly electoral mechanisms, exemplifies 
a means to overcome urban bias.312  Indeed, the literature emphasizes that democracies313 with better func-
tioning institutions314 provide higher levels of  public goods. 
Decentralization and devolution are also recommended in order to help overcome suboptimal policies 
caused by state incapacity and urban bias. Given that rural electrification is a primary goal of  Power Africa, 
there is a critical role for subnational governments and DG in Power Africa. Providing more authority and 
autonomy for subnational governments first and foremost removes the political pressures of  urban consti-
tuents, a core component of  urban bias, from the policy equation. Second, because there is a great deal of  
economic, environmental, and linguistic heterogeneity in sub-Saharan Africa, decentralization will be more 
efficient than central control because it allows administration to be tailored to local conditions.315 Lastly, DG 
projects will likely be more successful in the long-run under a decentralized approach because projects will 
better meet the needs of  end users and involve them in the development of  the project. Creating and em-
powering rural electrification agencies and rural electrification funds to oversee rural electrification should 
complement more macro-institutional reforms.
Additionally, African governments must be encouraged to rethink their current regulatory framework. In 
order for an extension of  access to electricity to become a reality, both the supply-side needs and demand-
-side needs of  electricity must be met. At its core, these two needs focus on making rural electrification 
commercially sustainable for IPPs and making access to power affordable for consumers. On the supply-
-side, uniform national tariffs should be replaced with cost-reflective tariffs in order to allow IPPs to charge 
higher prices to reflect the higher operating costs of  providing power to rural areas. More generally, despite 
the lack of  political unpopularity, allowing national utilities to raise prices in order to cover operating costs 
will address the serious issues of  commercial insolvency that plague African power utilities and reduce their 
credibility as off-takers. Additionally, African governments should continue to be encouraged to utilize and 
develop PPAs with deemed energy clauses in order to assure IPPs of  a revenue stream and limit the political 
risk associated with their development of  energy and power projects. 
On the demand-side, African governments must eschew extant subsidy structures that perversely support 
existing consumers of  electricity, often residing in urban areas. Instead, African governments should legalize 
cross-subsidies of  electricity and allow urban consumers to pay relatively higher prices in order for more 
rural consumers to afford electricity. Lastly, connection charges should be structured in a manner that both 
allow electricity providers to recoup their costs and potential consumers to afford connecting to the grid. 
For instance, capital subsidies could be provided by African governments or the development community in 
order to offset the high costs of  connection. Additionally, restructuring connection charges from a one-time, 
lump sum payment upfront to an amortization scheme where the connection cost is rolled into the tariff  or a 
long-term credit plan would allow for consumers to access the grid (netting the utility an additional customer) 
while repaying the connection charge in full over time. Ultimately, a broader and deeper understanding of  
African institutions and political economy can help light the way for powering development under the Power 
Africa Initiative. Without recognition of  the underlying institutional dynamics that structure the African 
power sector, Shango will continue to be enchained and Power Africa will face an uphill battle. 
312  See generally BaTes, supra note 183.
313  See supra notes 141-43.
314  See, e.g., supra note 144.
315  See supra notes 230-32.
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